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ABSTRACT 
 
The European Union (EU) is not a nation, and it would thus be a mistake to expect the 
EU's path to democratic legitimacy to resemble a nation's path toward such a goal. But 
what sort of democratic identity does the EU possess, exactly? In this paper, I will offer a 
tentative theory of the nature of European democracy after the Treaty of Lisbon and how 
the question of democratic deficit can be addressed. Additionally, I will suggest a few 
ways in which this peculiar post-Lisbon European identity may serve to enhance and 
augment the democratic legitimacy of its member states, without impairing their 
cherished individual national identities. 
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Introduction 
The Archaic Nation-State and the Future of the European Polity 
 
“If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.”1 
  
 
The European nation-state, which was once put on the pedestal as the true heir of 
political power, is no longer able to fulfill its task as the ideal structure of democracy. 
Within political theory, a wide variety of institutions and structures are considered based 
on their significant political impact, and yet, our common understanding of political 
power belongs to the traditional nation-state. Despite the reality that individuals no 
longer function only within a state, we expect all our political institutions to behave like 
states, prompting us to frown upon anything operating differently than the states we have 
grown fond of. States, therefore, remain the definition of democracy in an ever-
integrating world. This disconnection between people’s interactions and our 
understanding of political democracy’s domain inhibits the development of institutions 
that represent and promote a healthy democratic society true to individuals’ relations. 
The polemic of the democratic deficit in the European Union rests on this customary 
position of the nature of democracy, and yet, the idea of a democratic Europe is not a 
utopian illusion. States themselves were not able to respond to the political needs of the 
European people. Democracy beyond the traditional nation-state does not require a 
democratic revolution or a re-writing of the tenets of democratic principles. What it does 
require is a review of nationalism as a foundation of political association and the 
                                                
1 Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, The Leopard, Trans. Archibald Colquhoun. (New York: Pantheon 1960), 
29. 
  2 
understanding that political tools can be valuable beyond their current use. The objective 
of this paper is to offer some suggestions for an interpretation of the EU as a new political 
tool with democratic possibilities for Europe outside of national borders.  
In Europe, the attempt to provide stability between nations, in particular between 
Germany and France, initiated the European project, but this project continued and 
extended itself to include more representation as a consequence of people’s extensive 
interactions across borders. Paradoxically, the criticism, going under the umbrella term of 
the “European Union’s democratic deficit,” condemns the EU’s inability to address 
political issues the way states do. The concept of “democratic deficit” is used to explain 
the lack of communication and insight to the political process. Feeling of powerlessness 
among people right regards to their legislators, and the image of elite politicians in an 
ivory tower is often invoked. In other words, the people have not approved the power 
that the EU exercises. Much of the criticism is based on the fact that the EU lacks some 
basic aspects of politics institutions when compared to states. By re-visioning democratic 
legitimacy, the Union will no longer have to be apologetic for its awkward formal 
structure. It does not have to look like a state, because it has capabilities beyond a state. 
The ability comes out of a divorce between nationalism and political institutions, allowing 
a dispersed political community, united under the principle of democratic dialogue. At 
the same time, the EU must be responsive to its people. How the EU can approach more 
discussion by separating the idea of democracy and state will be discussed in this paper.   
Nationalistic believers are now desperately holding on to the traditional ways of 
political discourse in the name of democracy. A surge of souverainisme, the movement to 
restore national independence,2 colors the latest European Parliament elections. The 
nationalist movements’ success depends on the upholding of the nation as an inherent 
                                                
2 Sofia Vasilopoulou, "Varieties of Euroscepticism: The Case of the European Extreme Right," Journal of 
Contemporary European Research 5, no. 1 (2009): 4. 
  3 
and absolute entity. Europe does not hinge on nationalistic structures, despite the 
nationalistic movements’ recent advances and successes with strong right-wing leaders like 
Marine Le Pen in France, Viktor Orbán in Hungary or Nigel Farage in The United 
Kingdom in the forefront. While it is not only right-wing parties that are critical of the 
Europeanization of politics, they are the clearest example of opposition targeting political 
identity as something that can move beyond state borders Currently, these parties are also 
the fastest growing political movement within Europe.3 The right-wing success illustrates 
the general sentiment of EU-distrust, and the effectiveness of Eurosceptic propaganda 
suggesting that any power removed to the EU is power lost.4      
Their understanding of a democratic deficit in the EU rests on the idea that states 
are the unsurpassed bearers of a people’s voice. I will challenge this idea through the 
notion that nation-states have forced people to form their individual identity around said 
political structures, primarily by making people citizens of a particular country, a system 
encouraged by the Western, relatively homogenous, societies. By removing democratic 
structures from the complex and disputable ethnic, social, linguistic and cultural 
differences, and instead considering people’s political sympathies and individual interests 
outside of traditional political settings, Europe can extend democracy to truly 
communicate with, respond to, and account to its citizens. If we realize that democracy 
does not derive from states, but has a grander application, connected to the individual’s 
ability to shape his or her own life,5 and first then will we be able to consider ways of 
making a political structure that actually represents a people with a common interest, 
democratically. Few question the benefits of democracy, of belonging to a free society. It 
                                                
3 Daphne Halikiopoulou and Sofia Vasilopoulou, "Support for the Far Right in the 2014 European 
Parliament Elections: A Comparative Perspective," The Political Quarterly 85, no. 3 (2014): 285. 
4 Anđelko Milardović, "Euroscepticism in a Conflict of Ideologies of the Second Modernism," Euroscepticism 
and European Integration (2007): 64. 
5 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty & Representative Government (Rockville: Wildside Press LLC, 2007): 
203. 
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is the idea of belonging to, and identifying with, a system that is harder to explain and 
justify.  
 The EU aiding the development of a a social, collective movement beyond states, 
within Europe, and by including these movements in the political process we are able to 
look past otherness created by an arbitrary and flat sense of political identity. In other 
words, nationalities no longer represent a common and united group of people, and they 
therefore do not possess the best attributes for representing said groups of people. The 
EU is part of this transition, both by encouraging further beneficial interactions and 
facilitating regulations controlling these interactions democratically. Whilst Europe 
became more politically stabilized, after World War II, people were able to move beyond 
borders and find common interests, developing the social and political movement 
initiated by the states themselves. If the EU is able to absorb and channel these new 
attitudes and interests on a multi-dimensional level, allowing different levels of authority 
to process and execute different groups of people’s interests, Europe will be better 
represented, and hence more democratic. It is important to stress that the theory is not 
moving to further increase pan-European sentiments, nor does it favor regional 
sectarianism,6 since both theories force a further division between people. Instead, a 
diversification of political identity enabling every individual to broaden the understanding 
of others’ foundations would be encouraged. This is an argument for an empathic society, 
and a society where people specialize and express their interests, creating a more 
politically engaged society, which would foster a reduction in the sentiments of elite 
power in Brussels.  
This paper, therefore, argues for the EU’s ability to be democratic, and by 
extension suggests that EU can deepen the democratic society within Europe and the 
                                                
6 Christopher Harvie, The Rise of Regional Europe  (New York: Routledge, 2005), 91.  
  5 
European people. Through the EU’s aptitude of representing people as individual’s 
rather than just citizens, organizations can address different interest groups and 
encourage a broad, multi-fashioned sense of social and political identity independent of 
inherent nationalistic division. Rather than seeing oneself in the context of being only a 
citizen, individuals can, by association with different groups, develop a broader sense of 
belonging and commitment. What the foundation and limits of this commitment are is 
the focus of this discussion.  
At the same time, the critique regarding the democratic deficit has, historically, 
not been completely unfounded. The transition from an elitist structure centered in 
Brussels remains in people’s minds for a very simple reason: the EU began as an opaque 
and exclusive structure focusing on reducing volatility through economic integration prior 
to paying attention to democratic accountability. 7  Arguably, the criticism of its 
democratic deficit has encouraged the EU to increase transparency, direct 
communication and political tools for its citizens. By not being assured people’s trust by 
means of nationalism, the EU has had to work on generating a concrete and open 
democratic community.  
How can we normatively legitimize a democracy like the European Union that 
lies outside of the traditional notion of states and statehood-democracy? Are the political 
structures in place able to extend themselves to a broader understanding of a political 
community? In a achieving an understanding of democracy outside of states, the EU can 
address the criticism of the “democratic deficit.” The latest EU treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, 
ratified in 2009, offers some solutions to the problems of accountability direct 
communication between government and people. The treaty, besides clarifying and 
simplifying the EU, generally works to disperse political power and democratize 
                                                
7 John Agnew, Globalization and Sovereignty  (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 114.  
  6 
institutions. Emphasis is put on direct communication between individuals and Brussels, 
national governments and their courts, and regional spheres of political power, to name a 
few. This shows an attempt to widen the areas of political competence, and create an 
“intersectional society,” where the political process is spread to more sections of society, 
under the principle of subsidiarity.  
Instead of providing protection, states restrict civic engagement and inhibit 
people’s efforts to define themselves, a modern society should be able to address internal 
conflicts and provide space for a wide sense of political participation and belonging. This 
was the goal of the Lisbon Treaty. The European states are experiencing pressures from 
two sides, from political issues from within and beyond state borders. They face 
transnational issues like immigration and the environment, which need a unified 
approach among regional and global actors, and also many people have the feeling that 
politics is moving out of the hands of the people and towards political elites. But the vision 
embodied in the Lisbon Treaty offers an end goal, of creating a flexible and empathic 
political atmosphere where both geographical locality and international interest groups 
are able to be politically effective. This requires a definition of democracy relying heavily 
on civil participation and non-commercial interests gaining political space. Simply 
undercutting the EU’s ability to act, because it does not have the characteristics of state 
democracy is no longer sustainable.   
As a political tool to create stability and harmony in a time of turmoil, Hobbes 
saw the solution through strong governments, which would force the mob to organize.8 
At the time he may have been right; strong states were able to provide Western Europe 
with law, order and economic stability. But states are arguably no longer deserving of the 
position of protectors of peace, for they have compelled a group of individuals to become 
                                                
8 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Or, the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, (London: 
G. Routledge and Sons, 1894), 82. 
  7 
one people, reducing them through a misconstrued sense of self-identity and forcing a 
power struggle between competitive spheres of influence. Commenting on Hobbes, Carl 
Schmitt saw a problem in giving legitimacy to the one with power. Legality, too, was 
needed.9 Territorial states no longer have the political arena to themselves, and it is now 
time for them to graciously acknowledge the contribution of other sources of power and 
the influences of other democratic movements. The question now is of cooperation 
between governments and people: who is supposed to move this project further, and how 
do we maintain legitimate governance? To maintain control, states actually have to give 
way to external forces, to the very ideas, knowledge and institutions that in the end 
undercut the internal control. A juxtaposition that Henry Teune calls “’Gorbachev’s 
choice’ of sorts” because of the “constant trade-offs between internal control via inward 
closure for the sake of outward security on the one hand, and on the other hand, external 
influence through a semblance of internal openness.”10  
The EU is, arguably, the next steppingstone for developed and secure European 
states, as it has the ability to promote representation and social commitment through a 
multitude of venues, at both the institutional and grassroots level. If democracy moves 
beyond electoral representation in a binary relationship between the rulers and the ruled, 
the EU could take advantage of a more engaged political society empowered to address 
questions at various levels, which ever is most effective level, while taking advantage of a 
strong civically engaged social body. But the institutional structures in place are now 
inadequate in producing democratic outcomes. Accepting that all individuals cannot be 
grouped into a single faction whilst patronizing individualism in the larger context is 
pivotal in creating a more politically engaged society.  
                                                
9 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty  (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1985), 34. 
10 Henry Teune, "Deterritorialized: Global Citizenships," in The Future of Citizenship, ed. Jose V. Ciprut 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 238. 
  8 
In a world so clearly composed of opposing forces antagonizing each other, 
nation-states, in the traditional sense, are upholding the identities of people who are no 
longer just a “people.” David Calleo points to divisions and complexities within countries 
as the source of this instability, noting that ”the disquieting surge of racist and ethnic 
violence in many European countries, suggests that the continent’s peace and stability are 
not artless products of nature and should never be taken for granted.”11 These internal 
tensions highlight Europe’s many regional and sectarian identities, and suggest that the 
current structure is inept in dealing with them. The internal issues European states face 
today could never efficiently be solved by independent and isolated political policy. 
Instead, Europe needs a reassessment of the foundations of national identity, adjusted to 
reflect the actual order and association of people. If political action were able to reflect 
how people of Europe associate; not only on a national level, but conscious of regional, 
ethnic, ideological and international interests and relations, the power struggle between 
righteous national factions blinded by their own nationalist pride would decrease. Yet, 
simply resorting to regionalism would arguably also increase the sense of “otherness,” and 
it can therefore not be the holistic answer. The EU is one way to address the need of this 
flexibility. The common idea of uniform public opinion leads to mediocrity, but by 
encouraging a multitude of opinions, Europe could encourage a more committed public. 
Preventing public opinion from becoming a narrow and homogenous stream is 
the foundation for Mill’s On Liberty.12 Already in 1869, Mill noted European nations’ 
fortunate diversity: “Individuals, classes, nations, have been extremely unlike one another: 
they have stuck out a great variety of paths, each leading to something valuable.”13 Mill’s 
                                                
11 David P Calleo, Rethinking Europe's Future  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 6.  
12 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 4th ed, (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1869), 101. 
13 Ibid., 130. 
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method of supporting individuality and diverse opinion was through local governments.14 
Today, we are no longer dependent on small governments as the only avenues for 
people’s voices to be heard. We have access to a plethora of tools that enable political 
participants to be heard and to be mobilized on much larger transnational levels. The 
EU, a pioneer when it comes to taking advantage of differences for cooperation, is now 
facing the challenge of justifying itself democratically because of these very differences. I 
will in this paper attempt to show why these differences are a potential and not a 
restriction to democracy transnationally.   
The historical connection between the EU and its people is made in Chapter 
One. In Chapter Two, and Three I discuss the cornerstones of democracy and how 
supranational structures fit in a new understanding of individuals’ involvement in the 
political life. The foundation is both deliberative, giving political space a large platform, 
and constitutional to support a neutral communal foundation to unite over. In Chapter 
Four, I discuss the constitutional development of the two most recent treaties and how 
they relate to a more widespread and dispersed sense of politics. The mechanisms that 
actualize this democratic transition to both constitutional and deliberate exist. How the 
EU advances the idea of this type of democracy through the Lisbon Treaty is discussed in 
Chapter Five. These mechanisms focus on dispersing political authority, in particular to 
the individual.  These instruments and mechanisms include the Principle of Subsidiarity, 
the European Citizen’s Initiative (ECI), and the empowered EU parliament. Finally, in 
Chapter Six, I consider the extent of this European process in terms of personal identity, 
and discuss whether a normative, democratic description can substantiate a social, 
European identity.   
 
                                                
14 Ibid., 144. 
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Chapter One 
The European Project: A Historical Background 
 
“If Europe were once united in the sharing of its common inheritance there would be no limit to the 
happiness, prosperity and glory…”15 
 
How are we to make sense of a united Europe? And, further, what are the 
prerogatives for this vision? The question of integrating Europe on a social and political 
level has followed Europe since the end of World War II, and has led to a transition from 
divided and antagonistic states to a common European Project. Through the years, the 
tone and vision, when discussing integration and cooperation within Europe, has 
changed, making the discussion of a common Europe difficult. Adding the issue of 
democratic representation to questions of where and what Europe is becomes a daunting 
challenge. When not knowing what the European future is, or where the boundaries of 
Europe actually are, the question of how Europeans ought to be represented and what 
the institutions ought to look like requires careful moves. The transformation the EU has 
experienced must be understood knowing that the EU and the European integration 
began as project without a final goal. All that was known was that European integration 
was needed to stabilize the region, but the European future was in flux. To put the 
development of the EU in perspective, I will consider the coming to be of the EU, and the 
integration’s relationship to the traditional notion of nation-states. How can we make 
sense of European integration in retrospect?  
                                                
15 Winston Churchill, "United States of Europe," Speech, (Zürich, 19 September 1946). 
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The Creation of A Common Europe 
With the devastation after Second World War, Europe saw no other future than 
cooperation, prompting the first serious attempt of integration between states.16 While 
this was not the first common vision of Europe, right after World War II was the first time 
that this vision began to take concrete form. The first step was the creation of the Council 
of Europe, established in 1949. This construction did not establish any transnational 
institutions, rending the Council ineffective as it had little ability to coordinate a common 
interest.17 The Council of Europe is still an active institution, separate from the EU, but 
in the early stages it was not enough to coordinate a European future. Within Europe, 
sentiments for further integration and the creation of new political structures to address 
the economic cooperation emerged. Already here, we can see tension between 
movements seeking extended cooperation and those holding on to the idea of nation-
states and their absolute sovereignty. A variety of projects and visions were proposed as 
answers to the European question, and the victorious nations, both inside and outside 
Europe, continued to expand their models. The United States was particularly keen on 
the idea of free trade as a solution for Europe’s recovery. American investment was 
necessary for this development, and the United States became an important contributor 
to economic recovery of Europe after the war. The meeting at Bretton Woods in 1944 
was an early stage for the economic strategy and where the Marshall Plan was 
actualized.18 While this became the one major economic program between the United 
States and Europe, an array of agreement, economic, political and military, came in to 
being the years following World War II, most notably, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), Western Union, and the European Political Community (EPC).  
                                                
16 John McCormick, Understanding the European Union, 5th ed., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 49.  
17 Ibid., 48. 
18 Ibid., 50. 
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The biggest losers of World War II, Germany and France, were the most willing 
to engage in European economic integration beyond mere aid and cooperation. Europe 
needed integration. The signing of the Economic Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
also called the Schuman Doctrine, for the economic benefit of France and Germany, took 
place between six ministers the 9th of May 1950. This agreement Luuk Van Middelaar 
calls “the signing of a blank sheet of paper.”19 Where this new form of interaction would 
take Europe was not clear. The signing of a blank sheet has since then led to 
discrepancies between visions of Europe and the vision of a common Europe. The 
suggestion was a development of common interest for Europe, unlike what was realized in 
the Council of Europe, which mainly coordinated the states’ wishes.  
The Schuman Doctrine stated that the European Community, by fostering 
cooperation between Germany and France, would open up for cooperation between 
other European countries.20 In essence this was a peace project for Europe. In the early 
stages of the Union, the “inner circle,” the ministers and European diplomats like Robert 
Schuman and Jean Monnet, considered any division an impediment, while member states 
in general feared a pan-European identity, and therefore worked against the movement.21 
But already in this early stage of the European Project, there was an understanding of the 
community, or union as an on-going project: the Schuman Doctrine’s first principle says, 
“Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built 
through practical achievements which will first create real solidarity.”22 Whether the 
nature of the cooperation was meant to be primarily economic or geo-political is not 
clear, but EU cooperation would eventually stand for much more than economic profit. 
                                                
19 Luuk Van Middelaar, The Passage to Europe: How a Continent Became a Union  (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2013), 42. 
20 Pascal Fontaine, A New Idea for Europe. The Schuman Declaration-1950-2000. European Documentation, 2000  
(2000), 15.  
21 Luuk Van Middelaar, The Passage to Europe, 227. 
22 Pascal Fontaine, A New Idea for Europe, 15. 
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The discussion centered on stability, based on economic strength and collaboration, but 
the consequences for the dynamics of the people turned out to have wider implications.  
One stage of the development envisioned a “United States of Europe.”23 The 
Treaty of Rome in 1957 maintains that the states were seeking an “ever closer union.”24  
Here, Habermas points out another the key to the Union’s existence, a less positive one, 
namely indifference from the public.25 He argues the Union was possible because of 
apathetic masses that accepted the outcomes of the policies, and thus passively legitimized 
the Union after it came into place. Overall, the initial stages seem to have been less 
focused on democracy, and more on economic stability. The Treaty of Rome only had a 
quasi-exclusive arrangement, with an appointed Commission, a Council of Ministers and 
a Court of Justice.26 Divisions of powers were in order, something that came out of wider-
reaching decision-making powers and political areas, but there was little connection to 
European citizens. The only representative approach the Treaty of Rome came through 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States.27 This committee 
moved beyond infrequent meetings of diplomats and gradually led to an expansion of 
questions the Community addressed.  
The Community and the European vision actually led to a “Union” in 1991, 
through the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, or the Treaty on European Union. This 
was the first steppingstone for the EU as a political structure with direct obligations to the 
people. Here questions of citizenship and a single currency become relevant.28 And, with 
Maastricht, the discussion of EU democracy and its democratic deficit took form. Only 
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when the vision, that a few “elites” had constructed, extended to directly affect 
individuals, would the European Project attract any major public attention. Shortly 
afterward, as the issues of political and social identity emerged, it became clear that the 
EU must seriously address the question of political identity and belonging.  
With the enlargement of 2004, including ten Eastern European and 
Mediterranean states, the EU demonstrated it “was no longer an exclusive club for 
wealthy west Europeans.”29 This was the second test of the European Project as a 
democratic movement. After the enlargement, the EU included groups of people that 
historically had belonged to very different systems, and it showed that, to work, the EU 
must be based on principles other than natural ideas of belonging. As the EU continues to 
grow, this is a notion that must remain if the EU wants to maintain its democratic value 
and political significance.  
The latest treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, signed in December of 2007 and ratified 
December 2009, seems to address the need to maintain a structure unlike a nation-state 
while upholding a democratic structure.30 This treaty acts as an extension of the Treaty of 
European Union, by only adding sections and amendments. Most of the changes are 
institutional and act to democratize. For example, the number of members in the 
European Parliaments was increased, qualified majority voting in the Council of 
Ministers are most extensively used, and the EU attained personality, meaning it can act 
as one force.31 As the Union grew more diverse it became more obvious that it contained 
no natural and strong mechanisms of unity, but that the Union needed to control political 
areas. Thus, the discussion of democracy outside of national borders developed.   
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The Decline of the Nation-States and the Giving of Way to a Common Vision 
The nation-state, as the preeminent political structure, has a fairly short 
democratic history. We have can trace a transformation from small city-states in Athens 
to vast empires like the Ottoman Empire to the French Republic, some with instances of 
democracy. While states can be seen as fairly resilient, they are not completely 
independent of societal changes, and they are definitely not the sole inheritors of 
democratic principles. France, for example, experienced five democratic republics after 
the French Revolution. In the article “Power and Interdependence in the Information 
Age,” Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr. note that many modernists were 
surprised to see how long states lasted as the primary political instances, while having the 
odds against them. Withstanding the exclusive structure, states maintain a prominent 
role, even in an age of interconnectedness, with most economic and social interactions 
functioning outside of the states.32 Immigration is one example. Europe is facing an 
increase of refugees crossing Mediterranean Sea in insufficient boats.33 There are large 
numbers of refuges, and while I will later discuss the effectiveness of the EU in this case, it 
is clear that the Southern European countries cannot solve this human crisis 
independently. The question of refugees literally goes beyond borders and must be 
approached from a transnational perspective.  
Territorially states are in some sense depleted, and yet, they are our primary 
venue of political association. By underlining the temporal nature of nation-states, I aim 
to demonstrate democracy’s ability to function outside of the conventional state, but also 
to stress the importance of extending the democratic community to whatever social 
structure it encompasses. This takes us to the emerging of the EU as the unique political 
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experiment it is. Every state has its own individual history and reasons for emerging, but 
since my aim is to understand the EU in the context of European states, I have to look 
beyond these internal reasons, and focus on the common picture of the European states, 
and their common future.  
The Cost of Nationalism: The Rise and Decline of Nation-States  
James Tully wrote in Strange Multiplicity about the transitions states have made in 
order to accommodate historically excluded sections of society, like women and ethnic 
minorities.34 A state, which has to include more groups and continuously interpret itself to 
maintain momentum, is not naturally inclusive, by virtue of being based on a system of 
belonging and socio-political identity. The state being versatile makes up for its inherent 
exclusion. Traditional nation-states were not only inherently exclusionary, but their very 
survival depended on it. The system had a structural sovereignty issue, where the small 
nation-states defied the great powers to gain self-identity through the claim of territory, 
which helped the beginning of the World War I. Self-affirmation came at the cost of 
otherness and differentiation. Only after this, national self-determination is victorious. 
Stein Rokkan notes that the “waves of conquest and occupation, penetration and 
retrenchment, produce a complex distribution of ethnic/linguistic groups across Western 
Europe.”35 This is even more true in Eastern Europe. The justification for these states 
seems to be stability, but in fact nationalism made many of the postwar states extremely 
unstable.  
Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, one of the earliest works of social contract theory, 
argues for absolute sovereignty as a necessity for a state’s existence. His ideas fell closely in 
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line to the aim of the Westphalia Peace Treaty of 1648, namely a principle of non-
intervention and international security. The treaty ended the Thirty Years War, a 
particularly bloody time in European history colored by religious wars. The aim was to 
enforce stable borders and a mutual acceptance of each other’s absolute sovereignty. 
Hobbes points to the benefits of a social contract, where a ruler insures the following of 
one single source of power and one set of rules. Absolute rule and a single hierarchy of 
domestic authority prevent competition, diffidence and the pursuit of glory, and in turn 
ensure security of individuals.36 Only one set of rules enables the government to enforce 
protection against others and outsiders, without conflict of interest. “A common authority 
is created when everyone in a state of nature agrees to submit their Will, every one to his 
Will, and their Judgments, to his Judgment.”37  
Rokkan builds on Hobbes and his territorial configuration when he explains the 
need for strong and standardized nation-states.38 The nation-state did not create the 
homogenous society, but fed off it, and added the configuration of the nation through a 
consolidated territory, in defiance of others. The idea of nation-states and popular 
sovereignty Rokkan describes as time bombs.39 In the early 20th century, with peripheral 
territories under the influence of major powers, came the idea of independence. It was a 
moral justification for self-determination that drove the internal conflicts.  
Nation-states are identified as the problem of popular sovereignty, through the 
principle that is based on exclusion and expansion. This, I believe, explains the reasons 
for the states’ need for collaboration outside of the already set structures, and why this 
tensions between collaboration and nationalism exist.  
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Changes in the way Europeans Associate; Cooperation as a Response 
After World War II, along with the European countries losing their colonies, the 
states were more engaged with each other. Arguably, this is the realization that nation-
states are unstable in themselves, and needed engagement beyond the own borders. It 
solves the problem of weak nation-states, economically, at least. While still being a model 
created by a few states, what grew out of it was a consideration for the other, not as 
opponents or a threat, but as a potential. In the process of developing the EU’s emerging, 
we must consider another side of the states that began the process. Why was it crucial for 
the European states to cooperate after the World War II? Did the integration take place 
as a result of corporatism and a driving beneficial market or was there a grander 
understanding even for the nation-states themselves. During the earlier movements, 
statesmen were very much in control of the movements and the interactions between 
states.  
Later, with the decline of the Soviet Union, Europe experienced a spark of social 
movements, like the singing revolution in Lithuania40 or the human wall between Vilnius 
and Tallinn.41 The movement in Lithuania was nationalist, but was also an early civil 
movement and a demonstration that the European people demanded greater democratic 
involvement. It was no longer the government speaking for the public and articulating its 
demands, but the individuals themselves who wanted a say. Singing became that symbolic 
mechanism. The human wall further signifies the transnational unification of people 
against authoritarian states. People across nations created a wall, going from the Baltic 
capitals to show solidarity and political engagement. Both states and people themselves 
wrestled with the concept of political identity and association beyond the nation-state and 
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the relation between the self and one’s state. This cooperation showed the interest of the 
state was not always the interest of the people, and that people could have common 
interests that did not depend on the decline of another.  
Oneal and Russett note Kant’s prediction of the importance of interdependence 
between states two hundred years ago.42 Although an old assumption about states’ need 
of close relationships as a peacekeeping method, the idea that states would lose 
prominence is newer. It is, therefore, important to stress the idea that states are only a 
step in the process of identifying a self and the question of states’ relevance should be 
made based on their effectiveness in providing citizens and societies the possibility to 
participate in the political process. 
Implications of a Traditional Understanding of Democracy 
While states do not have inherent access to democracy, a supranational project 
like the EU, faces another set of problems. Before moving on to those democratic issues, 
an elaboration of what democratic means for nation-states is in order.  
By arguing for one ruler, Hobbes emphasized the need for supremacy, for it is 
better to be subjugated to one power than to be under the threat of everyone else. The 
discussion in Leviathan might have centered on one sole authority, but the application to 
sovereignty is relevant primarily as states are considered to have the highest order of 
authority. They separate themselves from other states by their autonomy, and through 
state supremacy, the validity of the international community is reduced. In traditional 
binary democracy a people are, through the vote, able to consider themselves citizens of a 
particular country and able to identify the leadership with the authority and power to 
execute legislation over said country. Or, as Habermas put it: “the government is 
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represented as an apparatus of public administration, and society as a market-structured 
network of interactions among private persons.”43 It is a single road between the people 
and the elected. The relationship between a state and its people defines the boundaries of 
a state and enables the state to be considered the sole proprietor of democracy. The 
electoral process has been the primary medium to clarify this relationship, for it 
legitimizes the process of the government and by extension the government itself. It 
presumes the people to be a whole and have the ultimate authority, which in turn 
legitimizes the system.44 The traditional understanding of popular sovereignty, as Bernard 
Yack sees it, where monarchs and representatives clamed legitimacy, is now moving 
towards indirect popular sovereignty, where the people as a whole plays a more central 
role.45  
 It is convenient to consider democracy as the people articulating their will through 
one united voice. Not only has the vote been the defining feature of a democracy, but it is 
also the primary tool for people to become active members in said community, and it is 
not necessarily the strongest or most democratic way however. It seems the association 
between the people and their state is effective to the extent that it has colored and shaped 
the common understanding of democracy. As a mechanism for the democratic society, 
the electoral system arguably encourages citizens to recognize themselves as participants 
through the voting process. But it has wrongly transformed citizens into one ‘united 
people’ with only one political task: voting. In such a system, authority and governance is 
at the center, and politics is not a social or communal business. 
When thinking about the procedural argument for democracy, in general, and in 
a historical context, we focus on the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. A clear 
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set of constituents and territory, governed by a specific government with clear statutes, 
has historically been the significant criteria for an effective democratic system. Our sense 
of democracy has developed with time, first as we have seen participation change through 
movements. If the principles of democracy are fully based on the principle of 
representation to a formal institution and only through the electoral vote, we are not only 
limiting the system itself, but also the spectrum of actions possible. Readdressing who the 
people are and how they associate, leads to a democratic life more conscious of people at 
their individual level. If we readdress democracy, as a normative concept outside of 
democratic statehood, the idea of statehood will be correctly seen as a construction. Yack 
suggests this by arguing for a de-nationalized political power: nationalism, as a cultural 
dimension could stop being a source of division,46 but rather become a space for diversity 
and sharing of history. This, in turn, will then allow societies to approach issues of 
otherness and alienation. 
But with a new concept of the individuals’ role, complemented with new 
technology and stability, this understanding of democracy is turned on its head. With a 
changing social structure, the boundaries of association do not always follow the 
boundaries of the states. The association between a government and its people primarily 
travels though the electoral process, which itself must be reconsidered, for it does not 
effectively address the participants in the ways they themselves act in a modern and 
globalized society. Continuing to rely on the idea of democracy as popular control of a 
government, I here aim to problematize the relationship between the state and the 
citizens, as the definition for democracy. While Europe, in particular, approaches a more 
regional type of society, the boundaries of and divisions between different levels of 
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government must be reexamined. This opens up the possibility of creating a political and 
democratic society that centers on and engages the citizens. 
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Chapter Two 
 Democracy Beyond the Nation-State 
 
“As soon as someone says about affairs of State what do I care? the State has to be considered lost”47 
 
Today, a democratic structure must address different problems and questions than 
the old systems, requiring greater sensitivity concerning the ambiguous boundaries of a 
modern society. While the geo-political system continues to change, a more globally 
understood definition of democracy has become indispensable. This search should be 
seen as a restriction of nation-states, and not democracy’s capability as an adaptable tool 
for good governance or as a response to the many national parliaments questioning the 
EU’s ability to be democratic. This chapter lays out the justification for a more extensive 
and broad vision of a constitutional and pan-deliberative democracy, and why the 
traditional sense of democracy restricts a politically accountable and engaged EU.   
A New Structure of Democracy 
Democracy in Europe has the potential to enable a strengthened local control 
through a broadening of the political landscape and a mobilization of the civil society. In 
other words, any structure outside of state and regional boundaries requires a relocation 
of power, but does not necessarily move it hierarchically upwards. Individuals continue to 
reorganize themselves in a social context, but the view of democracy as bound to the 
nation-states has become dated impeding an optimized political organization accounting 
for a global community. A revision would allow for more effective coordination between 
actors. If democracy is understood as people having effective control over policy and 
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legislation, and states do no longer represent a united people, the states cannot be solely 
responsible for endorsing a democratic society. 
The philosopher and EU scholar Jürgen Habermas, who envisioned a common 
European political identity, has partially developed the idea of a participatory democracy, 
rather than a representative one. 48  The interactions are not only between state-
representatives but also between the individuals, NGOs, regions, as well as states. This, I 
consider to be the necessary addition to traditional democracy. Beyond that, a foundation 
resting upon the understanding that the democratic structure is not only for an economic 
benefit, but rather, the states have inherent connection and the exchange between them 
that reaches beyond financial matters. The foundation here must still be legal and 
clarified constitutionally.  
With a broadened scope of democracy, social and political structures, have the 
potential to affect policy and legislation at the most local political level possible. While the 
EU cannot be defined in terms of financial profitability, I must discuss the advantages of 
incorporating a versatile sense of political belonging, and why it is important to tie 
engagement to a pluralist constitutional foundation. This definition leans on Jürgen 
Habermas deliberative democracy of right as connected to a constitution, which the 
people are part of,49 but reconsiders the extent of a defined popular sovereignty through 
the unity of one people. The pluralist constitutional model, “the current legal reality of 
competing constitutional claims of final authority among different legal orders and the 
judicial attempts at accommodating them,”50 together with a developed sense of political 
identity and the political influence of individual groups and movements, encouraged 
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through the political organization effectively addresses the perceived democratic deficit in 
the EU. In doing this, we must also consider the limitations, consequences and potential 
issues for a constitutional and deliberative democracy with focus on an intermingling of 
political identities and political venues.  
By extending democracy beyond states and national sovereignty, one can more 
easily visualize a legitimate and viable broad concept of democracy in a diverse, engaged 
society – a deliberate society. The political structures are now so large that a national 
identity cannot function as the unifying factor; instead, people’s political associations must 
diversify and cannot be represented by one body. This is not a new argument. The most 
famous democratic argument for a large and diverse society is laid out in Federalist 10.51 
Tensions between large polar factions are argued to harm the efficiency of the society, by 
making the factions immobile. A traditional political body assumes unity and connection 
based on one type of political, national, social or other excluding identity, this is 
something the EU could never achieve, or want to achieve. The justification must come 
from elsewhere. If a solidified citizenship to a distant political power is the only path to 
the EU, cynicism and apathy will grow among its citizens. From this negative vision, the 
common conception of Europeanism and EU’s lack of connectedness is constructed. The 
unity must therefore come from another type of foundational structure, arguably a 
normative structure inviting diversity through a flexible political identity and a broad 
sense of civil participation. The unity must be inclusive and not discarding any cultural, 
social or economic groups. What has lately emerged, as the force of democracy, is 
deliberation with a strong legal foundation, or constitutional foundation. 
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Deliberative Democracy: An Addition 
I here expand on the idea of deliberation as an addition to a European legal 
foundation by emphasizing democracy’s ability to influence and affect processes from an 
individual perspective. In doing so, I also have to problematize the idea of democracy in 
terms of people’s relation to their states. What is this deliberative foundation and what is 
the reason it does not come naturally to people’s understanding of the EU?  
Deliberate democracy relies on information sharing among individuals and 
between individuals and their government. It equally relies on the idea of a uniform 
political identity through the principle of deliberation itself. A necessary factor for this 
type of deliberation is applying a reasonable argument when considering legislation. 
Individuals, as well as legislators, must be part of this process. Communication and 
information sharing is central to any modern society, but ought to be more heavily relied 
upon as a form of political policy, where the activity of the public determines the 
democratic value. Many European Union scholars see deliberation as an important tool 
for the democratic development of the EU. Habermas develops this through his 
“discourse principle” and firmly connects deliberation to popular sovereignty. He notes: 
“Politics” is conceived as the reflective form of substantial ethical life, 
namely as the medium in which the members of somehow solitary 
communities become aware of their dependence on one another and, 
acting with full deliberation as citizens, further shape and develop existing 
relations of reciprocal recognition into an association of free and equal 
consociates under law.52 
 
Here, deliberation depends on individuals’ desire to participate, belong and 
improve their society. Ideally, it implies an extension of an individual’s empathy to 
include.  But, there are several reasons why we do not consider the EU to be a people’s 
movement in which the individuals have a strong and final say. Why? Firstly, as laid out 
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earlier, the construction of the EU took place behind closed doors among an elite and was 
generally opposed by the peripheral states. It was a project envisioned by a few, and 
executed by even fewer. It is easy to see why the states and their individual citizens would 
feel left out. The sole act of transferring political power upwards and away from the 
individual must then be deemed undemocratic. Many decisions are not made by 
unanimity of states, creating the feeling of an over-arching executive body.53 These are 
aspects that the EU is desperately trying to address and remedy. The Lisbon Treaty was a 
big step towards an opening up of the political process. This is a trend we can continue to 
expect.   
A second problem to be addressed is the political areas the EU considers. These 
are not the most salient, or topical, for the majority of people.54 The EU addresses 
transnational issues, questions of wide application and with solutions requiring 
transnational action. Generally, these issues take a low priority in national elections and 
debate. Ironically, this is the very reason the EU is needed – it is another platform for 
political issues, but, it also means the people are not comfortable with many of the issues 
debated, since they fall outside the everyday political discussions. There are therefore 
limits to how effective referenda or votes can be. In reality, the European Union is an 
opportunity to move away from this disengaged way of thinking about democracy. And 
people’s apathy towards these questions only emphasizes the need for a new platform like 
the EU.  
This takes us to the third issue. If people see themselves as nationals, there is not 
an incentive to concern themselves with a larger variety of political issues. People in a 
large global society cannot be promised they will have a direct effect on political 
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questions. However, there should still be an incentive to visualize political influence and 
inclusions.  
Finally, while informed individuals can make informed decisions about a variety 
of topics, one cannot put the entire burden on individuals themselves. Informed citizens 
can also expand their empathic boundaries by broadening their own sense of political and 
social belonging and identity. Schumpeter’s argument concerning the ignorant public, 
unequipped to rule, stands as a strong criticism to the traditional sense of democracy.55 
People who are not personally committed to the political structure will not bother to 
make themselves informed. It is not even rational to do so, since there is such a small 
return on the effort. Throughout this chapter, I attempt to address this problem by 
reconsidering the relationship among individuals within a community. It is irrational to 
think that participation would exist in a political society that has removed any personal, 
independent or passionate engagement, and has eliminated the possibility for people to 
identify themselves in those actions. 
Implications of Deliberate Democracy in the EU 
So what does deliberation actually mean in the context of the EU? It is the 
dispersing and widening of the political platform for individual citizens. By encouraging 
individuals to be democratic agents for a personal cause, and not completely dependent 
as constituents of the state, individuals can specialize and function in a democratic society 
by joining a particular cause of interest. This removes the pressure to have an omnipotent 
understanding or an interest in every issue. A removal of the compulsory structure where 
each citizen has to have a holistically formulated idea on a wide range of issues to which 
they have no personal interest or tie is therefore desired. The society can then highlight a 
wide range of specific interests or concerns, which would otherwise be rejected. This 
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partially addresses Schumpeter’s concern of an oblivious population, as it gives people an 
option while expanding ways people can actually participate.  
Most critiques depend on using deliberation as the only function of democracy. 
This is not the case; deliberation would only be the procedure of civil participation in EU 
democracy. Philippe C. Schmitter defined democracy by the terms concept, procedure and 
principles, arguing that seeing democracy through only one of these lenses would show an 
incomplete view of democracy and not the holistic phenomenon. 56  Habermas 
concentrated on the aspect of democracy as a procedure,57 for this is how citizens can 
actualize their popular sovereignty. I will extend this idea through the discussion of a 
constitutional principle.  
Habermas does include the notion of soft law, the notion of informal and non-
binding law, and he argues for an all-encompassing identity supported through this law, 
and by creating a strong, united political foundation.58 He can therefore afford to rely 
upon on deliberation as the founding aspect of democracy since he suggests an all-
encompassing identity. 59  The unification of a political society, through a common 
political identity, I argue, cannot be dependent on a system based on one identity. The 
society is continuously defining itself by expanding its spheres of influence and borders, 
through the inclusion of new states. In this, the society must have a weak or soft structure. 
The weakness, or softness, comes from the necessity to encompass a variety of social 
identities. The legal formulation making way for this political association must therefore 
be at the core. Since deliberation is only an addition to our understanding of democracy, 
through which people can explore and refocus how they unite and position themselves 
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within a community. Democracy in the EU is not dependent on the deliberative aspect, 
but should rather be seen as a possibility acquired through the extension of the political 
community. Possessing only one over-arching political identity is bound to be weak and 
unable to support the legitimacy of democracy. The whole point of adding deliberation is 
to open up path that individuals can take to engage themselves individually. If people are 
then forced to only pursue one type of identity, to fulfill the criteria of solidarity and unity, 
as they are the only democratically binding agents, then all deliberation is rendered 
useless. In an attempt to have an over-arching identity, the desires to unite and associate 
act counterproductive and streamline European identity. When defining democracy as 
the ability for individuals to make their voices heard in a variety of groups, and have a 
potential say in the legislative process, primary focus must be put on the links between the 
political decision and the individual citizen as an actor for different groups and ways that 
he associate.  
Deliberate democracy attempts to readdress the question of democracy being 
centered on the vote. Without a constitutional foundation safeguarding the democratic 
process too much pressure is put on deliberation as a uniting force. The problem with this 
structure is that it aims to eradicate all social differences so that people can adhere to the 
principle of debate. In the end, there has to be a meeting point between the political 
process and the people, here legitimacy comes into play. Habermas tried to find a 
meeting point, by arguing that there are no rights without the vote of the Peoples.60 
Without laying a strong foundation for a constraint of the states’ behavior, common 
grounds for rules and principles, there is little force behind the actions of the EU. The 
EU’s democratic legitimacy, like that of a state, is therefore solidified through a 
constitutional foundation – an agreement of the rules.  
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Constitutional Democracy in the EU   
The foundational aspect to EU democracy is the normative foundation on which the 
society and community can unite – a legal normative platform for democratic agreement 
and trust, which is supported through people’s endorsement of their political structure. 
Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum argue that even though there is no concrete 
constitution, the EU has a constitutional foundation, since it has a shared set of rules and 
procedures. 61  Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik call the ability to enter into legal 
agreements “one of the most important elements of legal sovereignty [because] it confers 
on national communities the power to enter into binding international legal agreements 
granting states reciprocal influence over each other’s policies.”62 
 Alexander Somek, although critical of the idea that constitutionalism has been 
established, suggests the unifying mechanism is a gradual acceptance of constitutionalism; 
“the project of submitting public power to the discipline of legal norms [requires] specific 
justification for the exercise of (state) power.”63 This type of soft constitutionalism is 
henceforth referred to “transitory constitutionalism.” In Chapter Three, I will develop the 
reactions of the European people with regards to development of a more concrete 
constitution.  
It is through this transitory constitutionalism that the requirement for deliberation 
and the incorporation of institutional mechanisms for civic participation becomes clear. 
Constitutionalism no longer means a fleshed out constitution, 64  just like public 
participation is no longer a coherent “will of the people” but a deliberation through voice 
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and consideration. The agreement on legal norms rests upon the idea that civic society 
has a better chance to affect policy through the legal foundation. Habermas stands in the 
forefront of the proponents for the necessity of political participation among the 
European people, as an extension of the public sphere.65 He connects this to the idea of 
positive law as a mechanism to maintain stability, or through people’s actual approval, a 
support upon which a constitution can be justified.66 The constitutional structure is today 
not a founding concrete document. Its structure is therefore not strong enough to carry 
transnational democratic legitimacy on its own shoulders, and requires public support. 
Still, it has significant democratic value.  
While this understanding of democracy is argued to be inclusive and extensive, 
the uniting constitutional foundation must be minimal to ensure non-exclusion based on 
terms other than the normative legal foundation. The idea is that democracy can extend 
the natural sense of political and social identity in favor of inclusion and diversity, but that 
the law itself must make the way for political association and a common identity. 
Limitations and the Normative Premise 
This extended idea of democracy, as a mechanism for the individual’s political 
action, is argued to be constitutional at the core. This constitutionalism will be the 
limiting regent of inclusion. It nurtures political participation, with citizens encouraged to 
associate in a variety of ways. While this is not limited to the EU as it stands today, this 
type of democracy assumes already existing and sovereign states, which have accepted the 
relationship between each other as something more than just economically beneficial. 
The relationship depends on a legal agreement and a mutual understanding of the 
democratic foundations. Furthermore, it presumes equality between states that are 
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entering into this relationship. In addition, by entering into the agreement of cooperation, 
the states are, at the same time, depleting themselves as absolute powers, in other words; 
there is a supranational tendency since other levels of political legislation and action 
emerges. If this type of democracy were only intergovernmental, demonstrating the 
democratic value would be made more difficult. But rather, the benefit of this 
supranational democracy is that the states that enter though the relationship aggregate to 
something more than the pure sum of the countries. In other words, by giving up aspects 
of their absolute power or sovereignty, the community can grow in terms of cooperation, 
democracy, engagement and even achievement. This assumes the ability of a state to do 
so fairly. To develop into a democratic community, the states that engage must believe 
and support a vibrant civil society to begin with. They must already have the basic 
institutions and functions of a liberal democracy. Constitutionalism is therefore, in reality, 
the limit to the European Union. Hypothetically, geographical and continental borders 
cannot make a difference in this democratic vision. But a state’s view of democracy and 
the individual’s role in it can make this difference. In Chapter 5, I come back to this 
notion of the limits of supranational governance through the discussion on Turkey’s 
admission to the Union.  
The Electoral Criticism of Transnational Democracy: A Responsive People 
When considering the EU as a result of a reshaped democratic society, one must 
be aware of the criticism that by allowing a transnational institution political power, the 
states are only giving up political authority. While the limits of constitutionalism might be 
vague, traditional borders are clearer. If suggesting that the only boundaries needed 
politically are those fluid and weak, have we completely eradicated the need for national, 
democratic borders? The perceived problem is that the globalized society will be too large 
for individuals to be heard at all, as the political venues, or “functioning democratic 
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institutions themselves,”67 Robert A. Dahl saw the people’s voice as the foundation for 
democracy.68 The platform to do that is national governments. Dahl says, “there remains 
a gulf at the European level between the citizens’ opinion and will formation, on the one 
hand, and the policies actually adopted to solve the pressing problems, on the other. This 
also explains why conceptions of the European Union and ideas of its future development 
have remained diffuse among the general population.”69 The state allows for uniformity 
through representation. Hobbes noted that a “multitude of men are made one person, 
when they are by one man, or one person, represented… for it is the unity of the 
representer, not the unity of the represented that make the person one.”70 On one level, 
representation, through votes for example, takes place with consenting individuals, but 
what does that really say about the true representation of the people as a unity? 
Alexander Somek argues that nationality, as a unity, accommodates more liberalism than 
a cosmopolitan vision.71 The worry is that national individualism would disappear with a 
broadened concept of democratic belonging. There would be more interests than places 
where they could be made heard, and minorities would draw the short end of the stick. 
Why? People would in the end not have complete self-determination. 
This view, again, depends on the belief that people within a state are united under 
a unifying set of conditions namely, nationalism. Anything that sidestepped this path 
towards self-expression as a nation is an impediment to the democratic structure. But, if 
the society were changing so that voices can be heard through different venues, would not 
a natural development of democracy follow? One people singing in chorus can easily fool 
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people to believe there is only one voice. The electoral process, through the veil of 
representative democracy is that one voice.  
Thinking that homogeneity of thought within a state will lead to stronger 
representation seems to actively conflict with the idea of citizens being actively engaged 
and committed. Further, what does this question of size of a democratic community 
mean, especially considering whether effective representation necessarily comes from 
close proximity to constituents? Alternatively, segmentation could be encouraged through 
participation on a multi-level structure.   
Responding in a Supranational Community 
The main limitation to a more globally oriented democracy seems to come from 
past experiences with democracy and not the tenants of democracy as a mechanism for 
the potential of an individual’s political influence. The electoral vote, as the derivative of 
their legitimacy through popular control, has limits. It may be the fundamental criterion 
for a democracy, but it is certainly not the only one. Still, Dahl points out something 
important about the “system of popular control over governmental policies” when he 
claims the vote is the only  “foundational enough to support a truly democratic 
process.”72 Using the European Union as an example, Dahl argues that while many 
aspects of democracy are admirable, the fundamental “popular control of polices” cannot 
be found in organizations. International institutions, from this perspective, cannot be 
democratic for they fall below the threshold of a democratic structure.73 The claim is that 
practices become unnecessarily removed from the people, contradicting democracy itself. 
This position is rooted in the idea that democracy is necessarily tied to the state, 
and is not addressing democracy as a theory, but is based on socio-historical criteria and 
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democratic statehood. Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik counter Dahl by distinguishing 
between popular participation and democracy, and giving democracy a wider definitional 
range by arguing non-elected bodies have democracy-enhancing effects, such as the court 
system.74 I will develop this by stressing the unique structure of the EU and how it can 
further enhance democracy within the EU, beyond traditional instances like judicial 
systems and constitutional checks and balances.  
With the solidifying of the EU, this discussion is becoming more and more 
pertinent. These perceived democratic limitations reside within the history of democratic 
societies, and with changing, more global, societies provide reevaluation of the principles 
democracies need. Although any institution or venue which contributes to collectively 
deliberated decisions is beneficial, grounding the argument from a national standpoint 
further distorts the idea of political participation in today’s Europe. Rule by the people 
cannot be solely tied to elections, and democracy is therefore perceived as desperately in 
need of re-evaluation.  The aim would be to perceive participation as an individual, 
regional and interest-based tool beyond the mere electoral vote. While Keohane, Macedo 
and Moravcsik lay out the benefits with multi-lateral organizations, in particular the EU, 
they do not expand on the new tools at the EU’s disposal that can further enhance 
democratic values, moving beyond the states’ ability to do so. They argue that 
organizations can expand on the collaboration through international agreements, and 
that they contribute by providing further instances of checks and protections for 
minorities, contrary to Somek’s view.75  
The question is whether or not the EU has the capability to improve the 
connection between people and their political institutions? Erik Gartzke and Megumi 
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Naoi object to the legitimacy of international organizations as being democratic by 
arguing that these organizations’ structure is political in a way that takes away from 
actual improvements for people, even though the intention of the organization may be to 
improve the lives of people.76 Much like Dahl, the two are critical of the discrepancies 
between immediately elected governments and the ones found in organizations, as a 
system of popular control is not immediate, although Gartzke and Naoi are focused on 
the democratic output rather than input. Dahl’s problem remains: “a world order might 
be created in order to deal with problems of universal scope, such as poverty, hunger, 
health, education, and the environment. But the opportunities available to the ordinary 
citizen to participate effectively in the decisions of a world government would diminish to 
the vanishing point.”77 The issue is of an effective legislative body, close enough to the 
issues where the people are affected and interested. This issue is called the “governmental 
gap.” This gap refers to the process of states losing political control, which makes the 
governments ineffective democratically. No matter the importance of the issues, it makes 
little sense to have a political structure to address it if it is completely opaque and made 
uninteresting. Benjamin Barber suggests the structure of legislation, when moving it too 
far away from the constituents, will give individuals no incentive to become informed and 
engaged, as it “yields neither the pleasures of participation nor the fellowship of civic 
association, neither the autonomy and self-governance of continuous political activity nor 
the enlarging mutuality of shared public goods.”78 The question of narrowing the gap 
between the political issues and people’s connection to them is therefore crucial.  
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The question of a European “we” is becoming increasingly overextended, as both 
national left and right-wing parties gain influence in the national parliaments by rejecting 
a European political order. Nationalist support is gained by rejecting a communal picture 
of Europe. Studies suggest that European citizens do not feel represented by the EU-
framework.79 How come global issues do not engage Europeans? Are these inherent 
problems for global concerns like climate, or can they be addressed through an extended 
political structure? Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik suggested that there are further 
benefits with a larger, regional political structure. For this, the political reality of 
unengaged and even critical citizen has to change. In other words, for this structure to be 
effective, it requires the public opinion itself to change and become more inclusive.  
Why the EU Must Be Considered A Democracy 
The EU, which is considered to be outside the realm of traditional democracy, 
cannot be excused on grounds that it is valuable for reasons outside of democracy, just as 
it is equally unfair to accuse the EU for not encompassing the qualities of states. They 
fulfill different functions, all needed in a globalized society where interactions are not 
limited to states. Majone calls the EU a “regulatory state” in control of monetary policies 
and trade barriers, which need to be effective to function and produce a desired output.80 
But, groups with the ability to regulate and have legislative interest also have an 
obligation to act democratically and give citizens a say over what affects them: Mill’s 
“potential voice in their own destiny.”81 These institutions are responsible for making 
themselves open to popular control for they are also the key to a more effective and 
representative authority. Instead of rejecting the EU as non-democratic, but seeing it as 
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part of the new ways to associate requires the institution itself to follow a democratic 
standard. This could become the principle that pushes the EU to further incorporate new 
democratic mechanisms. By being required to adhere to democratic values, the EU has 
had to struggle to give itself a democratic name.   
A more flexible way of associating politically could benefit the political 
environment by refocusing political questions and inciting individual political 
commitment. In a more globalized society, it would be easier for minority groups to find a 
large community to make their voices heard in. Globalization contains therefore the 
opportunity for an equal voice, or at least the potential to have one. Modern democracy 
would then allow different groups to be heard, not only as national citizens, but as 
informed individuals who are able to form interest groups and communicate their own 
positions.  
The EU is an example of the inevitable development in the global political arena, 
but accusing it of inapplicability to state-nation democracy means excusing it from 
popular control and transparency. The increase of international organizations in the 
global community, especially within Europe along with an increase of interrelations 
between different groups signifies that people associate themselves in a variety of ways. 
Arguably, this means that people should have the opportunity to govern themselves 
within these structures too. Having the political decision made where the social 
interaction takes place increases transparency as individuals will have a stronger, natural 
oversight. For example, an individual engaged in environmental groups might associate 
himself or herself as an environmentalist in some cases, and want to act politically within 
that sub-group. But thinking that this individual in every political move will put the 
environment first, or even give an environmental perspective proper political 
consideration seems both ill-advised and unrealistic. Thus, providing several political 
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venues can begin to remedy this problem of misrepresented individuals. A multi-level 
political arena allows people to consider a position without necessarily confining 
themselves to one position. The EU therefore challenges the nation-state as the only 
source of power and authority by widening the political platform. These new connections 
symbolize a change in how people move and associate. In other words, integrational 
movements on a European level did not necessitate a reassessment of the assumptions 
about democracy, but their very presence made a democratic reconsideration undeniable.   
Generally, overly positive sentiments about democracy have driven people to 
consider democracy to be inherently well functioning and desirable. Democracy is seen as 
the solution to any political issues. Samuel P. Huntington questions the necessity of 
making democracy the sole answer to our society. He distinguishes between constitutional 
liberalism and democracy, arguing that democracy is only the principle not in itself 
providing a fair and just society like the modern liberal western states. Huntington writes 
from the perspective of developing democracies that only uphold a shadow of democratic 
values while still not representing its people.82 Democracy, says Huntington, is thus only 
one aspect of a well-functioning government, along with individual rights. He means that 
democracy in combination with constitutional liberalism is what we generally think of as 
a democratic society in the West. Constitutional liberalism, not democracy, ensures 
inherent rights and liberties, and must therefore concern itself with the goals of a state 
rather than the structure. Only seeing democracy as a process would lead to a completely 
useless and ineffective principle in that it has become all encompassing. Continuing this 
line of arguing, even when assuming that the democratic electoral system is functioning, 
Schmitter makes the criticism that “however central to democracy, elections occur 
intermittently and only allow citizen to choose between the highly aggregated alternatives 
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offered by political parties.”83 So, when arguing that elections are the key function for a 
democratic society to be democratic, assuming this mechanism is appropriately followed 
through, it gives citizens a limited choice and is not a continuing form of participation.  
But, rather than looking at democracy as people’s voice in a society where the 
decisions are translated through direct representation, democratic engagement should be 
understood through how people choose to associate and identify. The system is not 
dependent on a public having a complete political structure of preferences sorted out. It is 
not direct democracy where a united people have to formulate an opinion on every topic, 
but where people, with a particular interest, have the opportunity to make their voices 
heard on specific issues, where the agenda responds to people’s preferences and interests, 
and where people are encouraged to have such interests. Taking Dahl’s concept of 
responsive governments able to cater to people’s particular interests and using it against 
himself, this could be an argument for moving against this binary exchange for one that 
promotes different venues where people can be heard in their particular field.84 
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Chapter Three 
Consequences of Transnational Democracy  
 
 
I have established that politics at the EU-level must be accepted as democratic, 
and furthermore, that democracy must be supported by deliberation as well as ever 
evolving and fluid constitutionalism. In some senses we can expect democracy to function 
similarly to states, but in others democracy will look very different. My argument leans on 
the idea that supporting democracy on a transnational level actually leads to an overall 
strengthening of democracy for the individual citizen. By tying together the social aspects 
of how Europeans associate with political mechanisms, one should expect to see an 
elevated understanding of what democracy is and what it can do for the individual. Here, 
I consider some of the effects and consequences of this dispersion in modern democracy.  
Local Political Strong-Holds 
When expanding upon the principle that democracy ought to take place at several 
legislative instances, we must question where exactly the power will move. Barber 
suggests the solution is an interconnected city-based system. Barber believes in 
strengthening of cities, as they are the cartel of democracy.85 Power should arguably 
remain where the people are politically active. The home should be where politics is 
made, since that is where people will feel connected and empowered by responsibility. 
Barber argues that most people live in urban societies, and it is from there that questions 
should be addressed, even questions beyond the cities or states themselves. His slogan is 
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“Mayors to Rule the World.” Whereas nation-states are a fairly new construction, 
speaking against their stability, cities are an ancient type of community.86  Global 
governance is developed through a network of cities to deal with grander, interdependent 
issues. Barber notes “United Cities and Local Governance” as a type of cooperation that 
accommodates this desire. This is another example of the many movements acting 
outside of states to address transnational issues showing, yet again, that national structures 
are unable to effectively address the issues of today.  
Where is the EU’s place in this? While the EU is located much higher than both 
cities and nation-states, the Union does promote the concept of dispersing political power 
at the level where it is the most effective. This principle is called the Subsidiarity Principle 
and how the Lisbon Treaty has made this key principle more relevant will be explained in 
further detail in Chapter Four. 
Moving Away from Geographical Proximity 
While Barber speaks of the intermingling of regionalism, and the advantage of 
regional cooperation, I would like to take it a step further and emphasize the need to 
consider network outside of geographical alignments. Through the promotion of relations 
based on personal interest and attachment, links between people having nothing to do 
with each other geographically can be made. The benefits of this concept of democracy 
are that it removes the pressures of procedural requirements and any ethnic distinctions, 
while allowing individuals to group themselves around several political agendas and 
causes. These are constructions, which can be encouraged, but are not yet fully active 
within the whole of the EU. The passivity can be explained by customs of associating 
geographically, but it does not mean that we are unable to extend our spheres of 
consideration. Regionality will inevitably depend on socio-cultural ways of associating – 
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cities are powerful because the inhabitants feel a direct political connection and are 
directly exposed to political outcomes at the local level. Cities and towns are successful 
political entities because the people living within or around the city have much more in 
common than people do across states. Regardless, if the possibility of normative ways of 
connecting were encouraged, we would see an extension of interactions, and these 
benefits ought to be further explored. Socially, we are already expanding our spheres, and 
it is only a matter of time until the standard of political practice is based on the same 
humanitarian standard.  
 The principle of “Territorial Cohesion” is a principle already initiated by the EU, 
and while it is restricted to geographical exchanges, it is a move in the right direction. In 
2008, the European Commission published a paper, called the Green Paper, describing 
the need to assimilate the “territorial diversity into strength.”87 In other words, the EU 
itself is recognizing the limitations of the power a state holds and notes in the Green 
Paper the “need to promote co-operation, dialogue and partnership between the different 
levels of government, organisations and the people implementing policy on the 
ground.”88 The recognition that Europe has connections that go beyond geographical 
boundaries is an important revelation. It is the first step towards a democratic society and 
structure that is less discriminatory and more holistically inclusive in its decision-making. 
This is done through a focus on political issues outside of geographical association, and 
will arguably lead to a more direct political discussion. If this is enabled, it is a strong 
criticism of state-democracy, since states, almost inherently, makes decisions from a state-
level. 
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Facing Regional Differences 
The enlargement of 2004 was the largest and most diverse single enlargement of 
the EU. The inclusion of Central and Eastern European countries and new states created 
from the former Soviet Union posed a new type of challenge for the EU. The 
geographical and demographical structure of the EU changed as the EU became more 
rural and dispersed. Distances between centers have grown, and continue to grow. This 
dispersion posed a systematic threat to the existing political system and seriously 
questioned the role of regionalism in political discussion. While the Green Paper focuses 
on the geographical region and physical distances using the buzzwords, ‘Concentration - 
Connection – Co-operation,’ which adopts an environmental perspective by discussing 
how transportation and mobility, the perception of political space has changed. This 
paper develops this notion of democratic thought by bringing in a connectedness not only 
on a regional or territorial perspective, but a conceptual one where communication and 
exchange between different types of groups or movements across Europe have a valid 
democratic significance. This movement, supported by a strong constitutional foundation, 
has the opportunity to advance the current state of democracy within the EU.  
Projects attempting to engage individuals and youth, in social and political 
questions continue to appear within EU. These programs range from the grassroots level 
all the way to programs sponsored by the EU.  However, while they are steadily gaining 
ground, their united contribution to a democratic society is rarely considered. If 
rethinking democracy as the expression of emancipated individuals in a diverse setting 
taking advantage of the cultural, social, and personal differences, then the EU could 
create a holistic political society supporting a network of legal norms. This structure 
would support political legislation at the most effective level. EU would then develop a 
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strong legislative body foundation, with the support of the people, without completely 
depending on an apathetic body.  
A Large Political Community Does Not Mean Succumbing to Mass Preferences 
Using the idea of democracy as an applicable tool where the people have the best 
chance of being represented, we can rethink Tocqueville’s fear of the tyranny of majority, 
through democracy - "[t]he very essence of democratic government consists in the 
absolute sovereignty of the majority."89 Without diminishing democracy to just one value 
of the governing authority or defining democracy as everything we want in a government, 
democracy has a potential new place. After being elected as president of Belarus 
Aleksandr Lukashenko famously said “There will be no dictatorship. I am of the people, 
and I am going to be for the people”.90 Is this really all we want from democracy? How 
can we reconsider democracy with reducing it to an incomprehensible wishful thought of 
a utopian society? I will address this question in terms of participation at a larger scale. 
We are no longer living in isolated, independent communities, and just as our living 
situation has changed, so must our political organization change. One could still claim 
that a truly democratic life should come from one man, one vote, but right now, the more 
effective solution would include more aspects of participation. The dichotomy between 
one voice and no vote is a false dilemma. While citizens think their political needs are 
addressed through a national government, EU principles, like the Subsidiarity Principle 
could potentially bring the political agenda even closer to the political question or and the 
individuals in question.  
First comes the understanding that democracy is not connected to a specific type 
of government or mode of ruling. Democratic institutions take many shapes and forms 
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just like people associate in different groups with need of structure and order. This implies 
that democratic legitimacy has the ability to arise out of different capacities, theories or 
functions. As Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik pointed out earlier, international 
organizations have the potential to strengthen democracy, not by conveying electoral 
power, but by safeguarding other structures giving the people other benefits like 
protection of human and minority rights.91 A refocusing on this view of democracy has 
emerged in the time of globalization where the lines between citizens and authorities are 
becoming increasingly blurred, the implication being that there are other types of 
legitimate governments beyond the idea of the traditional nation state type. This 
enhances the chance for consideration of different perspectives and opinions.  
But by addressing aspects of the political life in settings beyond the state, 
groupings and perspectives outside of the traditional state-level can take form and help 
reevaluate issues or challenge people are facing. Arguably, any mechanism allowing 
citizens to be engaged and to participate is part of democracy. A purely majoritarian 
democracy is traditionally characterized as “tyranny of the majority.”92 Further, an 
acknowledgement among democratic structures, at different levels, supporting each other, 
should be considered an extension of democracy appropriate to the 21st century.   
The dark side of this broad sense of democracy is the potential for a lopsided 
democratic input, where the opportunity for individuals and interest groups is only a 
smoke screen for executive decisions. Benvenisti and Downs claim that the regulatory 
power has been transferred to the executive branches of dominant states by the states 
themselves. They will further argue that the involvement of the national courts, together 
with international tribunals, is a possible way forward, where political power can be 
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overseen, reviewed and regulated more democratically.93 Why it is essential to have the 
intermingling of different levels of authority and organization is something that I will 
return to in Chapter 3. In other words, any consideration is an opportunity for a 
specification of personal or individual preferences.  
Reducing democracy to simply being electorally justified, through the vote, and 
by forcing a sterile and inflexible view of democratic activity impedes the complex 
structure vital to a full-fledged democratic society is a static structure that states and 
communities no longer can afford. A state’s ability to participate in organizations and 
movements offers a solidification and expansion of the democratic society, insofar as said 
involvement does not hinder the state’s internal democratic activity in the process. The 
route though the state is not the only way to strengthen a democratic society, just as 
elections are not the only source of democracy. After the EU was criticized for being 
undemocratic and widening the government gap, the Union, through the Lisbon Treaty, 
endeavored to reduce this gap by strengthening the subsidiarity principle. The idea of 
subsidiarity plays a role in most institutions and government, and traces of these ideas can 
be found within European integration almost from its beginnings, including the Rome 
Treaty of 1957.94 But the principle got a large revival with the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. In 
Chapter 3, I will examine the recent changes in this treaty and how effective and practical 
they are. But note here that the desire to cooperate on a larger level does not rule out the 
potential for connected and effective governance. And the democratic structure that I 
propose ought not to lead to an elitist structure in Brussels.   
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The EU Is Not a New Super-State, Nor a Federalist Entity  
The structure of the European Union is fundamentally unlike that of the national 
governments. Frankly, the later stages in the process of integration is moving the EU 
further away from any earlier expressed political form. Earlier, I considered the 
importance of understanding democracy as an applicable tool and process, rather than a 
system to be followed. Allowing the political system to represent the Union should 
therefore not attempt to mimic the national government’s paths to legitimatization, but 
remain the different kind of animal it is, accepted not only through an electoral body, but 
also as a platform of public authority. Ideas of constitutionalism and participation no 
longer belong to states only. From the perspective of legitimized democracy based on 
directly elected governments, although the EU parliament should be at the center of the 
EU system, currently it is not. This is not to say that there are no similarities between 
states and the EU. Nor would it be advisable to suggest an attack on democratic activity 
on a national level. Ideally, any structure will have a theoretical justification for its actions 
over its constituents, and for its own action, corresponding to its behavior on the ground, 
as they are not exchangeable. It would be absurd to expect two governing bodies whose 
purposes do not align to have the exact same means of justifying their means of gaining 
acceptance as authority. In wanting to create an international system on the grounds of a 
nation state’s legitimization, the nation states and the international organization would be 
in competition for the same power. By allowing a diversified legitimization system and a 
broad sense of democracy, more parties would be allowed to participate without conflict. 
Saying that a diversification should be allowed is however not the same as arguing for an 
absence of accountability through low legitimacy.   
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The Channels of Democratic Input  
The clash between the visions of national sovereignty versus civil society is 
beginning to crystalize, though the marriage of constitutionalism is yet to be considered. 
While the civil society is taking up more and more space on the political arena, it is still 
not clear how the EU is attempting to contribute or what its self-view is. We are 
beginning to see a normative justification based on a general acceptance of EU 
legislation, through obedience to the rules in place. This, I outlined as the minimum 
requirement for a functioning Union, but we still have to outline the specific forces 
allowing a concrete direction towards a democratic structure. The subjective support, is 
said to be “soft” a position supported through passive or negative referenda or party 
competition. Interestingly, this criticism sometimes cancels out. For instances, right-
wingers in the UK oppose expanding social regulations while the leftists ardently support 
it. Further, the center fears extremist views in the EU. All are suspicious of democratic 
legitimacy. 
  Achim Hurrelmann specifies three main venues for democratic input in the EU. 
One is the European Parliament, the second is communication from the national 
governments and parliaments, and the third is “the inclusion of organized civil society in 
EU policymaking.”95 On the other hand, Juan Mayoral, writing for the European Union 
Democracy Observatory commented that the Lisbon Treaty is aiming “at reinforcing 
democracy in its representative and participatory dimensions.”96 This means that there 
are at least two viable paths to legitimate democracy: from society directly, and through 
the traditional governments. The former focuses on a deliberate sense of democracy 
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where binary communication is in focus, and the latter considers oversight and 
transparency within a hierarchical system. This approach, incorporating society as a 
democratic force more directly, suggests a sensitivity of the forces at play and makes room 
for a more diverse and engaged public society. The Lisbon Treaty states: “Every citizen 
shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be 
taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen.”97 
  Jürgen Habermas suggests there is a postponing of supranational democracy, 
because of the unpopularity of integration,98 meaning that while the monetary structure is 
becoming increasingly predominant, democratic channels are held back in fear, as 
countries fear to lose their integrity. “Nation states could well preserve their integrity as 
states within a supranational democracy by retaining both their roles of the implementing 
administration and the final custodian of civil liberties,” suggesting a community method. In 
this method, the people do not see “their political fate ... determined by foreign 
governments who represent the interests of other nations, rather than by a government 
that is bound only by their own democratic vote.”99  
The reluctance of States to provide democratic flexibility while opening up the 
markets has resulted in this fear of democratic discrepancy. While diversification of the 
democratic process is feared among the states, as shown by the German Federal Court 
case on the democratic legitimacy on the Treaty of Lisbon, supranational democracy 
could be beneficial. The EU allows for interest groups to make themselves heard, and it 
avoids the typical left/right dynamic, making it both more confusing, but also politically 
more interesting as national representatives can rethink political issues in different 
political groups. This is not to deny that there should be a stronger effort to reduce the 
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gap between supranational institutions and the public in Europe, a cause with which few 
would disagree. 
Shared Responsibility Is No One’s Responsibility; The Issue of Power Diffusion 
The EU is still justifying its democratic legitimacy using representative democracy, 
since the EU is a platform where “[c]itizens are directly represented at Union level in the 
European Parliament,” as articulated in Art 8A in the Lisbon Treaty.100 While still 
holding on to its representative aspects, the EU is making way for a more open political 
structure. The general point of conflict is that of rights and the will of a particular people, 
where multilevel governance further muddles the playing field. In other words, by 
crowding the field, accountability is harder to be located. Without a straightforward 
hierarchy, it becomes harder to demand rights and obligations. It is not only that the EU 
is making states more closely knit, but that it also diffuses the role of states. 
Where individuals are given a wider field of play, and anyone has opportunity to 
participate, there will inevitably be a struggle for the final say and the ultimate control. 
Technology has allowed us to communicate more than ever, and the capabilities have 
allowed everyone to participate. As Joseph Nye stated, “the stage is crowded.” When 
arguing for a power diffusion through increased accessibility of information.101 Habermas 
argues that states’ diminishing political power stems from a capitalistic and global market 
system. He points out that the borders play less and less of a role, but it is not only 
borders, rather the system as a whole that is diminishing.102  
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While I have demonstrated why a revision of democracy might be necessary 
within Europe, and what the potential gains this could bring, there are still concerns with 
a loose and decentralized political structure. An example demonstrating the risk of 
removing power inhibiting action is the Union’s handling of the migration crisis in the 
Mediterranean, a problem that became painfully evident after the tragedy at Lampedusa 
in October 2013 where almost 400 migrants drowned in the ocean. While this is not the 
only occurrence of this kind of humanitarian catastrophe at the Mediterranean Sea, it 
was one of the first times it became a question for the EU and its capacities as a 
transnational institution with humanitarian focus.  
The political instability in North Africa and the Middle East drove more people to 
travel by boat after 2011, a journey that takes thousands of lives each year. After the 
celebrated Italian search and rescue program, Mare Nostrum, patrolling the waters to 
rescue migrants on shipwrecks, the European Union planned to take over in late 2014.103 
Problematically, the European operation, Triton, was in many ways more limited than 
the Italian Mare Nostrum. Instead of seeking people in need, Triton is instead focused on 
overseeing the European shore, leaving thousands of people to drown in the waters 
between Africa and Europe. It functions as a border control instead of a search-and-
rescue mission, and is generally considered preventing the mission from saving lives. In 
fact, Triton’s budget is only a third of Mare Nostrum’s.104 Further, many European 
countries do not support Triton as a project. It is not only ineffective in what it attempts 
to accomplish, but it is also not backed by the member states.105 One of the cornerstones 
for EU is it humanitarian mission, so not being supported by all countries may not be an 
issue. Not being more effective than one individual state is however a significant 
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drawback for the EU as an institution able to address transnational issues better than 
states. Many times, the Union moves ahead of its member states in the struggle for 
human rights, but, if it is in the end incapable of carrying out its visions, the vision will be 
lost. Besides possibly being less effective, accountability is a potential issue, if shifting 
blame. Clarifying the structure and role of EU itself, as done in the Lisbon Treaty could 
be a first step to address this issue. While I will return to this issue through the discussion 
of the Subsidiarity Principle in Chapter Five, it is important to note that the EU as a 
holistic, executive structure, with a personality, is as capable as conventional states to be 
addressed and be held accountable. The dispersal and different political platforms could 
even be a venue where criticisms and reform can be made. In essence, this means a more 
transparent and fluid structure compared to states, but not necessarily one that is harder 
to be held accountable.     
European Judicial Power  
How are judicial institutions cooperating to strengthen democracy? The idea of 
judicial review follows in the discussion of checks and balances as a method of 
accountability. The 1963 Van Gend en Loos judgment is a landmark for the Union and 
its constitutional legitimacy. It is an example of how different instances of judicial power 
interacted, to assert that a member state had obligations towards its members through EU 
law. The European Judicial Court (ECJ) concluded that Community Law “imposes 
obligation on individuals but also intended to confer upon them rights which become part 
of their legal heritage.”106 It meant that legal power was given to the European Judicial 
Court (ECJ) for the protection of individuals. This principle is now called the “direct 
effect.” 
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Three states involved in the case were Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. The 
states appealed against the idea of being accountable to their citizens for the rights, but 
lost. Benvenisti and Downs note that the ECJ did not see national sovereignty as the final 
stop but saw the individual citizen and the national court as important players as well. 
They continue by arguing that the ECJ was protecting the smaller states through their 
decision.107 Although the authors see a risk with this scattered power structure, they are 
suggesting that this will lead to more cooperation, as this is more beneficial for both 
parties. The judicial system is therefore another venue where checks and balances can be 
developed.108 
The national courts were viewed as capable of disregarding national politics, and 
enforcing the Community law regardless of the state’s compliance. This means a law 
based democratic development. Benvenisti and Downs argue this enhances democracy by 
providing necessary information which state executives’ collusion could prevent, gives 
weaker powers protection against powerful foreign actors, and the courts provide a “voice 
to those formally excluded from decision-making.” 
This not only limits national sovereignty, but it also emphasizes the layered 
interactions between individual citizens and authorities on various levels. But, was this 
made at the expense of national courts? Possibly, but Keohane notes that judicial power 
can no longer be seen as unilateral, rather it is “pooled”109and as a complementary 
power, the parliament is encouraged.  
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Limitations of a Broad Concept of Democracy   
As explained by Buchanan and Keohane, “‘Legitimacy’ has both a normative and 
a sociological meaning.”110 So there is a difference between the right to rule and the belief 
that someone has the right to rule. I will later argue that the EU in particular has the right 
to rule through this change of association, so that people of Europe within the European 
Union are experiencing the strongest form of representation, reflective of their social and 
political association. The right to rule should be dependent on an encouragement of 
participation through different venues and mechanism, which are dependent on both 
direct and indirect routes of influence and not only an electoral process. Frederick 
Barnard notes the problem of altering these principles too rapidly, losing the original 
meaning.111 
Tension within the European Commission and the Council of Ministers comes 
from a continuous emphasis on national interests. These institutions are not prone to 
democratic dispersion and fluidity because they are primarily conveying states’ voices and 
positions. Despite this reality, the EU is the platform where this type of democratic input 
is gaining foothold. How can we explain these different democratic movements, and on 
what basis can the EU actually claim democratic legitimacy? Is it from the extension of 
representative democracy within the European Parliament, or is this opportunity of 
democratic input supported by a strong constitutional democracy?  
The creation of a European polity, strengthened by Habermas’ popular 
sovereignty principle is the first step to this bond. One advantage with this kind of 
association is that the emphasized sense of identity will not be able to skew one agenda 
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above all and thus this prevents “tyranny of the majority.”112 By not always seeing a 
political agenda through the benefit of the state as a whole, but rather through people it 
addresses, each political question remains on the level where the effect takes place. The 
Aristotelian way of a politically active domain, run by the individuals affected by the 
political life, more closely connects to an individual’s life. Each political question will be 
most easy to associate with or at least be considered from a wider set of ideas. A 
solidification of bonds between countries, as well as between groups of people in different 
countries, using coalitions and alignments, would enhance participation true to the 
interests and sentiments of groups of peoples, and thereby strengthen the democratic 
society. By putting the decision-making where it makes a difference, the significance of 
said decision will have a clearer relevance to people. In other words, by relocating the 
power away from states, and moving it in multiple different directions, an opportunity for 
more local and focused control opens, unrestricted by territorial barriers. 
Consequentially, the European countries would move further away from representative 
democracy, and towards participatory democracy. This is not to say states or parliaments 
will vanish, or become redundant in the near future. This is merely a suggestion to 
reconsider the democratic structures, and how the EU best could be a part of that 
process.  
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Chapter Four 
 What is Europe Ready for? The Purpose of the Lisbon Treaty and 
Fate of the European Constitution Treaty 
 
"United in diversity"113 
 
 
How far does the imagination of Europe reach, and what happens when the 
visions of the elites surpasses the comfort of the people? Is the EU Europe’s Candide, 
oblivious to backlashes and critique, only waiting to realize it is not in the ‘best of all 
possible worlds’? Or is the EU’s vision of integration and openness only ahead of some of 
its critical member states? Two treaties, the Treaty establishing a Constitution of Europe 
and the Treaty of Lisbon, signify the two latest attempts to make the EU “more 
democratic, more transparent and more efficient.”114 The EU has gradually experienced 
a merge of functions, and is continuously seen as a holistic structure. This came about 
through streamlining and an expansion of the overarching structure, where many of the 
old branched have been merged together into a coherent body. How have these two 
treaties specifically contributed to the democratic discussion in Europe and why did the 
EU fail to ratify the Constitutional Treaty in 2004? The different European treaties 
continue to reshape the structure and purpose of the EU, just as criticisms about the 
changes of authority continue. The main criticism addresses the centralization of power 
and the decrease of national parliamentary power.115 Does this criticism derive from 
seeing democracy as inherently state-based, or is it the fear or a federalization? The 
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balance seems to fluctuate between maintaining a close bond to national governments 
and developing its own purpose and structure.  
 This chapter considers whether, and how, the Treaty of Lisbon, is moving 
towards stronger representation for different groups of people, and thusly suggests a 
defense of the European project corresponding to a modern sense of association and 
political participation. A move towards a constitutional foundation cannot be explained 
solely through a contractual agreement, just as it cannot be defended on an electoral 
premise. What then drives it further, and how can we make sense of these two treaties 
based on this? To assess this, the Constitutional Treaty, a Treaty though never ratified, 
must be considered to understand the path the EU is setting out towards and what the 
states’ responses are. I here demonstrate, more concretely, how the EU contributes to the 
pooled democracy, both popular and constitutional, supported by an under-arching 
understanding of the European identity. I also explore and how these two proposed 
treaties function as a catalyst for the sentiment of Europeanism. The lack of any 
traditional basis for the political cooperation has produced a high-resistance to the 
processes at play and needs a new venue for conflict resolution, or worse, apathy. The 
Constitutional Treaty was an attempt to push this cooperation further by encouraging a 
more formal constitution. But the delicate structure between the member states and the 
political center of the EU saw different on the question of a formal document uniting the 
members. When the Constitutional Treaty fell through, it opened up the discussion of 
how EU actions could be made more legitimate and to what extent a European 
citizenship and in a common vision of political truth was needed? Regardless of the 
failure of the Constitutional Treaty, the EU moves towards the acceptance deliberation 
and justification of power. Can legal acceptance really explain the submission to the EU 
for states, and would that be enough? I argue this is an important minimum legitimacy 
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requirement and an important starting point for the actors, but that a successful structure 
requires a civil social and popular support as well.   
The Failed Constitution 
The Constitutional Treaty, which can be considered a buildup to the “watered 
down version” of the Lisbon Treaty, was signed in 2004. However France and the 
Netherlands then rejected it through referenda.116 Why? There was a symbolic direction 
towards statehood using an anthem, and a motto: “Its administration favours the many 
instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy,” and a more direct reference – 
namely the name of the Treaty. The suggestion of a constitution clearly suggested a more 
state-like or federal Europe, regardless of the actual structure of the system. The concept 
of a constitution for Europe pushed the states too far. The “institutional fact”117 of 
something looking and feeling like a constitution, was unlike any of the soft agreements 
between states earlier. I exaggerate the point of the constitution to demonstrate that 
sensibilities often determine the outcome of negotiations. Middelaar notes that “some of 
the members dreamed of a founding momen a la Philadephia 1787.”118 Yet, when push 
comes to shove, Europe would continue with the “‘Monnet method’ of gradual 
integration,”119 rather than taking another large jump in terms of concept and agenda, 
keeping in mind this is the same year as the eastern enlargement. The mere feeling of a 
federalization and rapid change had an effect on the acceptance of EU regulation. The 
question is now: is the EU moving towards a structure of constitutionalism despite the 
failure for the 2004 Treaty?   
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A Constitutional Foundation Without the Constitutional Treaty 
Most people agree the difference between the two treaties is marginal,120 further 
supporting the notion that the Constitutional Treaty was not ratified because of the 
constitutional aspirations. Setting the constitutional relationship in stone, created 
connotations Europeans were unaccustomed to. The Lisbon Treaty, the second attempt 
to re-structure and clarify the Union, had to appeal to the states not as a federalist 
concept, but as having a concrete constitution, since emphasis was put on unity and 
negotiations. That the actual differences are marginal suggests, in support of Somek’s 
vision, that the member states were already in the process of accepting a constitutional 
basis, beyond the nation-state, although not tied to a specific signing or document.121  
The differences might not have been drastic, but the sense and goal had changed, 
and this, arguably, had a positive effect on the state of democracy, as the Union more 
directly had to promote a multi-leveled democratic structure. Rather than accepting a 
federal structure, efforts were made to be deliberate and open for democratic venues at 
different levels of the political spectrum. To avoid the problem of political centralization 
and an empowered elite, the EU actively attempted to empower different sections of the 
Union, and not only the member states or move power upward. Yet, there are several 
reservations to the Lisbon approach of pooling sovereignty. The German Court decision 
is probably the most famous dissent to this modernized version of democracy. It was 
based on the traditional sense of electoral democracy and further bases its decision on 
individuals right to an equal vote, rejecting smaller countries’ proportionally larger say. 
To review the effect of the Lisbon Treaty and the idea of transnational constitutionalism, 
a discussion on the criticism the treaty received from the German Federal Constitutional 
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Court decision in the ‘Lisbon Case’ is in order. Since the focus of this paper is on the 
democratic relationship between states, its citizens and the EU, the German Court 
decision provides a relevant criticism for our purposes.   
German Federal Court: Dissenting a European Constitutional Right 
The German Federal Constitutional Court found the Lisbon Treaty inconsistent 
with German Basic Law based on models of electoral democracy and constitutional 
identity.122 The disproportionate participation in the European parliament, giving smaller 
countries a disproportionately larger voice, was according to the Court, a violation 
against state sovereignty. Their rationale was based on electoral democracy as it 
connected free and equal participation secured in human dignity.123 By not putting the 
individual at the center, the Union ignored the individual citizens rights to one man, one 
vote. The Court proposed a rejuvenation of state sovereignty, claiming that a 
communitarian level could not replace it. Hence, this was not an issue of removing the 
voices of the parliaments; rather, the issue was the disproportionate power each country 
received. Again, coming down to the question of how democracy can be safeguarded and 
what mechanism it is produced by. The Courts held the perspective of state sovereignty’s 
necessity, and rejected the treaty using a rational similar to the Dutch and Netherlands 
referenda of the Constitutional Treaty – state nationality and constitutions came first.124 
In the case of the Lisbon Treaty, the idea of statehood is less of a priority and that the 
national states themselves hold more firmly on to the traditional sense of legitimacy and 
legal authority. In essence, the states believed in the idea that the member states 
themselves constituted the EU and held the ultimate power.   
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The German Court argued that the parliament compromised the sovereignty of 
the people. This was the definition of sovereign states in the decision:  
Sovereign statehood stands for a pacified space and the order provided 
within this space on the basis of individual freedom and collective self 
determination. The state is neither myth nor an end in itself, but a 
historically grown, globally recognised form of organisation of a capable 
political community.125  
 
The Court discounts the Lisbon Treaty’s claim to constitutional legitimacy, as it does not 
have and “constitutional identity.”126 Constitutionalism, in their eyes, belongs to states 
and requires a concrete contract – a written agreement of the supremacy of the states and 
their legal power. Siding for maintenance of democracy within the state, arguably invokes 
two ideas: protection of national politics and further involvement of national actors on the 
European level. This, quite directly, this moves away from the idea of disposal of state 
power. Yet, it speaks to the actual agreement that states entered in to through the signing 
of the Lisbon Treaty  
The Goal of the Lisbon Treaty  
The goal after the Constitutional Treaty was to find a middle ground where the 
EU could continue to function effectively while finding a stronger foothold 
democratically. Earlier discussions and agreement, notably the Laeken Declaration of 
2001, the Declaration discussing the “Future of the European Union,” called for a 
“deeper and wider debate.”127 In some sense, there was a move towards democracy in a 
traditional sense, giving more space to communication and interaction between citizens 
and the political powers, probably to give perceived legitimacy. Generally, the Lisbon 
retracted from the idea of the EU as a final destination for political power. The desired 
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perception seems to be a tier shaped distribution of power where the people are at the 
bottom and the Union itself is at the top. As an emending treaty, is it supposed to be read 
in combination with the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty of the European Union, and 
primarily re-structures the already set out path.128 Focus is put on clarification.  
While I argue that the democracy should actually be considered much more 
disperse and multifaceted, this straightforward shape seems to be the easiest way to justify 
democracy within the EU. Having an accessible understanding of the EU and its process 
is important for the support of the movement. This is arguably one of the major 
achievements with the Lisbon Treaty. The creation of a president, giving a face to the 
EU, is one way of making it more accessible.  
Overall, and partially as a result of the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, the 
drafters of the Lisbon Treaty seemed to aimed for a clarification, simplification and 
appeasement of national states; a give and take between the states and the community. 
The goal was to give the perception of democratic legitimacy, through popular 
sovereignty.    
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Chapter Five  
 Mechanisms Enabling a European Political Community through 
the Lisbon Treaty 
 
 
I have established that the legal foundation for the EU is firstly constitutional, like 
any liberal state democracy. But this is as far as the comparison between states’ and the 
EU’s democracy goes. Even though the Lisbon Treaty is arguably leaning towards a 
strengthening of popular sovereignty, legitimacy also comes from the normative structure 
articulated. However, the normative process of legitimizing democracy in the EU cannot 
only come from this popular support. Here, I consider the structural mechanisms along 
with the implications on the dispersed and open democracy outside of the states’ realm.    
Political theorists, like Moravcsik, to a large extent, define EU’s democracy as 
state-based democracy, legitimized through the separation of powers and voting 
requirements.129 While Moravcsik suggests that even indirect democratic mechanisms, 
such as checks and balances are enough to ensure transparent and responsive 
policymaking,130 he does not fully make way for a new type of structure with distinct 
qualities and potential. A separation between democracy and state-based powers has the 
opportunity to strengthen civil participation and that could enhance the democracy’s 
effectiveness. What we have earlier established can be summarized by Macdeo: “in 
designing and adopting popular constitutions, additional mechanisms are adopted to 
further improve the quality of collective deliberation: expert administrative agencies, 
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politically arms-length commissions, and courts with the power to review.”131 Criticisms 
of the EU’s democratic deficit cannot solely found themselves upon the notion of an 
absent public participation, but to be effective, they must attack the constitutional 
background and foundation. Why? Very few within the population are active participants 
in the electoral process, and yet the ways people do arrange and associate themselves 
suggest a democratic shift within the EU. Modern democracy does not hinge on 
participation through the electoral process, but any medium for participation that 
contributes to the political community is valuable, and the definition of European 
democracy must include these developments. I will here assess the quality of these 
mechanisms established in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. 
Requirements of the EU Fostering a Strengthened Civic Democracy 
The problem the EU’s democracy faces springs from the nationalistic idea of 
political identity. A system, that surpasses the nationalistic pothole, while maintaining a 
clear normative path towards a democratic and united community, can create a 
democracy that exceeds any traditional sense of democratic institution. In order to 
achieve this type of community the definition of democracy must include a consideration 
of the individual in a variety of associations. In other words, or ideally, a dispersed 
democracy encourages individuals to relate more deeply to a variety of questions, groups 
and identity, which would prevent inherent polarization of political issues. To establish 
this, two phenomena are required. The first is namely a strong, but flexible normative 
foundation that unites the communities. This structure has already been laid out in 
previous chapter. The second requirement is instruments that encourage a diversification 
of political participation. An individual should have the opportunity to engage with the 
political structure through a variety of venues. If successful, the civil society is 
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strengthened and individuals will to a lesser extent feel tied down to one type of identity. 
In the creation of a more engaged political society, individuals will have a greater ability 
to choose their own way of associating and becoming engaged. Together these 
instruments prove the advantage of a diversification of democracy within EU. The 
diversification is not hindered by political polarization if supported by a legal, normative 
agreement. So, what are these mechanisms?  
Mechanisms in the Lisbon Treaty Aiding an Intersectional Civil Society  
The EU has been pressured to respond to a lack of democratic input from 
European civil society, but how effective are the mechanisms introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty? And does this treaty respond to the ideas of flexibility of democratic input? 
Required is an assessment of the political tools from a deliberative and globalized 
democratic perspective. There are several layers to deliberative policymaking, counting 
inclusion of personal particular interest, minority groups and mobilization. Central is the 
idea of an individual’s ability to belong to a multitude of interests and groups. In other 
words, one’s identity cannot be tied to one particular faction. Once this has been 
established, the insurance of actual influence and political power of the individual must be 
assessed? Some of these mechanisms in the Lisbon Treaty that have been highlighted as 
democratizing agents are the European Citizens Initiative (ECI), the empowered 
European Parliament, and the Subsidiarity Principle.132  
These democratic movements should not be seen as primarily reactionary, but 
they should be from an institutionalized framework. This is not a shift but rather a steady 
progression of social integration. The advantage of a strengthened political structure in 
the EU would then be an emphasis on these voices.  
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Naturally, the transition for global interaction and contractual engagement 
between states began with states themselves. It would a mistake to stop there, as the 
potential of similar movements go beyond the current acceptance or rationality. Political 
movements, with individuals at the core, working outside of national borders has a 
democratic significance. Although I am considering mechanisms created by the EU, these 
are functions that begin to structurally acknowledge the need to address questions outside 
of the state, with an emphasis on individuals as regionalized citizens. These should be 
emphasized since, in the construction of a united identity, which although founded on a 
constitutional basis is separate from direct public influence, one of the main issues is the 
mistrust of the political and social movement as a whole. Individuals’ initiatives as a 
mechanism of belonging come into play here. Crucial is the notion of action by 
individuals, as private citizens, not lobbies and special interest groups. The investment 
cannot come from financial incentives or be profit-based. And it is here the European 
Citizens Initiatives becomes interesting.  
European Citizens Initiative  
The ECI gives individuals the right to request legislation to be put forward in the 
European Commission. This is a modern form of direct democracy, and an addition 
through the Lisbon Treaty. The requirement for a successful ECI is one million 
signatures by citizens from at least seven member states. The petition also has to be 
within the scope of the EU legislative area. It should be seen as an “agenda-setting and 
policy-shaping instrument,” since it is not legally binding.133 But in essence, the initiative 
creates a new platform for democratic participation, as individuals. The requirement of 
having seven states represented emerged as a protection against special interest 
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corporations or groups, and stresses the idea of individuals coming together around one 
issue. By having multiple states represented the EU is not only discouraging special 
interest groups, but also nationalistic or regional leanings. What kind of participation are 
we seeing here? The actual variety of topics brought up through the ECI suggests that 
now there can be a widening of the political sphere of influence. Issues brought up vary 
greatly, and do not follow the generally discussed political areas. The ECI called 
Right2Water demanded free clean water, and another demanded better youth exchange 
programs, while a third proposed a ban on the use of human embryos in research.134  
One limitation is that a successful ECI can only make recommendations, and not 
impose obligations. While this is a restriction to the ECI, this limitation can be defended 
through the argument that this is a mechanism meant to increase the variety of 
discussions and not act in a restricting way. Still, this restriction became very significant in 
the ECI that opposes the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The 
TTIP is an agreement between the US and the EU. During negotiations of this 
agreement, the ECI was initiated to oppose it. It received more than the necessary 
signatures, but did not qualify as an ECI. The Commission’s response was: “your 
proposed citizens' initiative falls outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit 
a proposal for a legal act of the Union.”135 
The Subsidiarity Principle 
The Subsidiarity Principle is often brought forward as EU’s way of guaranteeing 
effective local governance, where decisions are made as close as possible to the citizen and 
constant checks verify that actions are justified when considering the capacities of 
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national, regional or local levels.136 The idea goes back to the principle of increased local 
control. The principle suggests that the most central and removed authority in a society 
should act when a lower level of government or institution cannot achieve a goal better or 
equally satisfactory. When something only concerns a local government is no reason for 
higher political authority to decide for that community.  
This is not a new principle in any political society, but its reemphasis in the Lisbon 
Treaty highlights the EU’s desire to accommodate and empower a variety of legislative 
approaches, again suggesting a dispersal of power, but an ordered one, with 
accountability maintained. The principle stems from the Catholic Church, and subsidum, 
which is the idea of aid or help.137 The Catholic doctrine suggests individual needs must 
be fulfilled, and the state can oversee and intervene only when necessary. It was present in 
the founding treaty of the Union, which states that the ”Community shall take action … 
to the extent to which the objective referred to … can be attained better at Community 
level than the level of the individual Member States.”138 
An Empowered European Parliament 
Through the empowerment of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament is 
developing from “a mere consultative chamber into an important co-decision institution 
for most EU legislative and for the adaption of the EU budget.”139 The Commission is 
responsible to the Parliament, which now has a stronger say procedurally. Today the 
Parliament is on an equal footing with EU Council in most policy areas, and it is no 
longer a consultative chamber. The Lisbon Treaty empowers the Parliament by giving it 
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power to monitor and control the Commission, to elect the President of the Commission, 
and to co-deicide expenditures in the budget.140  
According to Hix and Høyland, the Parliament has “evolved from the toothless 
Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community.”141 The most common argument 
for the democratic deficit within the EU leans on the understanding that people do not 
have a direct connection to the legislatures. A supported parliament is therefore a very 
straightforward way of demonstrating traditional political power between legislatures and 
people through the election by universal suffrage of all citizens of the EU. While this is 
not the primary way that the EU defends its structure democratically, this functions as an 
appeasement for people like Miller who argues that any mechanism contravening 
majority rule is undemocratic.142  
The Desired Type of Political Participation 
“You can set the agenda!”143 promises the European Commission with regards to 
the ECI. While the EU displays and officially encourages a European civil society, much 
of the actual political power still remains behind the opaque doors of the European 
Council. After the discussion of what democracy in EU could lead to and the effect it 
could have on the European people’s view of their own role and political engagement, 
what is the actual status of these movements, and do they have a political backbone?  
Are the mechanisms limiting the framework of the political participation, since the 
EU introduces them, or are they incorporating interests outside of the structure itself? 
Meaning that, if the EU is the introducer or initiator of all political activity, then will 
everything not come back to the EU? The exchange between the social and the 
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institutionalized in a modern democracy have here been emphasized, while keeping in 
mind distorted political power through corporate lobby groups and other less 
democratically inclined groups. If the EU manages to nourish and develop this 
overarching sense of oversight and community, while giving space to smaller 
communities, its presence would only encourage politicization on a variety of levels.   
What these mechanisms show is that the EU is actively addressing the question of 
democratic legitimacy, through the Lisbon Treaty. However, there are other, more 
inherently structural qualities of the EU that speak to this dispersed sense of democratic 
participation. Regardless of the actual empowerment of the parliament, the structural 
composition itself shows how the EU is encouraging a wider political consideration. The 
parliament is structured through political groups to some extent are structured on a left to 
right scale, and yet, the national parties do have to consider a wider range of political 
issues within those groups.144 In other words, the coalition process looks different than in 
the national parliaments, and this supports deliberation through coalition formation and 
group line focus, which changes the behavior of the parties when compared to national 
parliaments.145  
Finally, there are several layers to consider when talking about democracy within 
the EU. On one level, the mere coordination on a transnational level suggests certain 
questions can be more effectively addressed. On another, the interaction between 
representatives suggests collaboration outside of the left-to-right discussions that take 
place. While there is a clear attempt to diversify the communication within the 
community, both institutionally and by supporting grassroots-movements and exchanges 
between people.  
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Chapter Six  
The Limits of Political Identity and the European Union: A Social 
Europe? 
 
 
“Of course one can jump up and down yelling Europe! Europe! Europe! But it amounts to nothing and it 
means nothing”146 
  
A political community must care to live together, united, with the desire to better 
the community as a whole. What is the foundation for this whole? I have in this paper 
attempted to argue that, by creating national, ethnic and cultural divisions, political 
powers in Europe weaken the potential of a healthy democracy within the continent. In a 
system that is structured around its own diversity, the democratic institutions in place 
must support the principles of cooperation, mutual recognition and benefit. The 
institutions must speak to these democratic principles, to ensure legitimacy. But are said 
principles enough to unite the people as social beings and create a sense of togetherness? 
And how are people to accept these changes in democratic thought? 
People associate in ways that surpass the political structure, which is why 
democracy itself cannot be sustained on principles of constitutionalism divorced from 
people’s everyday lives. The solution, in terms of political organization, incorporates and 
focuses on deliberative participation starting from the individual. When accepted as a 
trend the acceptance of democracy as transnational will follow. And further, an extended 
politicization of social engagement and belonging could support a common 
understanding of unity.  
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Still, this is not an argument for a popular definition of democratic legitimacy. As 
a foundation, the EU must function beyond the states in terms of its political structure. By 
being weak, fluid and open it becomes more novel. By bringing democracy beyond its 
legal concept, the agreements by which they willingly abide, this more neutral and formal 
way of operating has proved itself essential to the modern ways of associating and 
communicating. The idea of formal cooperation, separated from any traditional forms of 
identifications brings together the Union politically, and strengthens the claim to 
democracy, but what does it actually do for the people who are supposed to interact 
within the political system? Is the mere interaction between people and the moral claim to 
co-operation enough to create inherent connections between individuals and societies? It 
seems absurd to think that people depend on the legal structure to define their 
relationships to each other. At the same time, the argument for democracy in the EU 
depends on the distinction between a democratic and a social foundation. What remains 
is the question of where that leaves the European political identity and a consideration of 
the social understandings tied to the EU. What principle of identity does the EU fall 
under, beyond democracy? In other words, how are citizens supposed to identify within 
the structure? Because of the democratic principles of the EU and the abandonment of 
traditional ways of associating, it is difficult to give the EU a final social structure or social 
identity. In this way, adaptability and inclusion is also a constraint.    
Strong Democratic Criteria, a Consequence of the Extended Participatory Requirements 
Since this idea of democracy within the EU depends on active civil participation 
with individuals acting in their capacity as individuals, a normative democratic 
understanding of participation becomes central. Requiring member-states to have an 
extremely strong level of civil participation is one of the most important ways to assess 
compatibility within the EU. This is also the way to demonstrate democratic legitimacy 
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more concretely. By allowing individuals and citizens to engage and communicate in a 
wider political context, we will grow accustomed to the idea that we have political interest 
beyond the borders. This formulation of democracy requires no formal foundation or 
abstract explanation. Rather, it is based on the idea that by giving the ability to 
communicate and widen the platform people will realize the benefits that follow. The 
provision of a vibrant civil society is not a strong uniting force, but by encouraging a 
variety of ways to identify and act, is a powerful mechanism. The common understanding 
of democratic association is therefore both a requirement for members and a uniting 
force amongst them. It is therefore the lack of democratic institutions, and an active civil 
society, that justifies an exclusion from the EU and not the adherence to a specific 
religion, ethnic groups, culture, or nationality. As the EU expanded, it came to signify 
more diversity, and became simultaneously more focused on the democratic and human 
rights foundational aspect, using this as uniting principle. The accession of Romania and 
Bulgaria in 2007 to the EU resulted in criticisms and hesitation from the founding 
countries. The EU could no longer be equated with a homogenous West, and began to 
become more conscious of its own fluidity. This brings us to Turkey’s application for 
membership in the EU. The EU is now faced with a potential member-state that 
demands serious reconsideration of the foundation and identity of the EU. Turkey puts 
the EU to the test and potentially may require the EU to become a new political 
structure. The idea of Turkish membership to the EU needs to be evaluated from a 
compatibility standpoint in terms of democratic values.  
Limits to the EU: Not a Global Democracy? 
The identification of the EU is therefore a choice politically and democratically, 
and democratic compatibility ought to be the measuring stick used for potential members. 
Anything else would only put the EU in the same position as traditional states. But what 
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this seems to lead to, is a social issue where people do not have the social connection 
necessary to carry the EU as a political institution. The historian Timothy Snyder argues 
that the EU needs a conception of itself to become more stable.147 The Lisbon Treaty 
makes it possible for the EU to define itself, politically. This conception is arguably based 
on a constitution, using legal norms, which allows for a more open and flexible political 
structure that moves away from traditional ways of associating. The EU then experiences 
drastic structural and geographical changes as this self-realization comes into effect. 
Entrance into the EU is based on political, economic and administrative standards, which 
suggests no geographical or socio-religious exclusions.148 The democratic criterion does 
not define the identity that member-states are supposed to have. In identifying oneself as 
a democratic movement, the principle upon which members and individuals can unite 
under, the EU can both strengthen itself as it considers its own limits. It will be more 
difficult to see a social identity coming out of this. What is the problem with this potential 
lack of social conception? 
Europe East of The Union – the Case of Turkey 
Currently, all eyes are on Turkey, the largest potential new member. If the EU 
really is a movement based on cooperation and not social-cultural ways of identification, 
Turkey deserves a serious evaluation as a potential member-state based on its democratic 
structure and political climate. Whether or not Turkey should be part of the EU is outside 
the scope for this paper and argument. Reinforced, however, is the notion that Turkey 
must be evaluated only on the basis of democratic principles and potential. Historical 
antagonism between the Ottoman Empire and Europe is still, in many people’s eyes, 
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coloring the conversation of Turkey’s membership, “Turkey is Europe’s Other.”149 In 
many ways this goes back to the Enlargement of 2004, but is, by nature of size and 
religious and cultural difference, an even grander potential move. Bahar Rumelili looks at 
EU-Turkey relations from an identity perspective and suggests that, currently, the two 
identities are not compatible, and contain a sense of otherness, but that there are many 
reasons to believe these identities can and should be reshaped, allowing Turkey to 
enter.150 The obvious point of tension point between the EU and Turkey is religious: 
Christianity versus Islam. While the EU has branded itself as a neutral entity, in terms of 
religion, historically it is white and Christian. How Turkey is therefore considered is 
important when thinking about the foundation for the EU. The EU must base its decision 
about Turkey purely on its compatibility democratically. Rumelili bases this on a 
constructivist view of identity, arguing that identity is elastic, and cannot be completely 
“divorced from objectified traits, such as race, ethnicity, religion, history, culture or 
political systems”.151 I, on the other hand, argue that EU identity must be primarily 
dependent on the formal democracy, as a normative and constitutional structure. This 
however does not mean that religious or cultural differences cannot be represented within 
it or that the EU does not need a coherent vision of itself. Historically, European identity 
has changed a great deal, and arguably, some of this happened after the transnational 
institutions were in process.  
Rumelili continues with the understanding that identity cannot be “divorced from 
interests.”152 But, this realist perceptive cannot explain the EU, which can hardly support 
itself on the premise that it will always be beneficial. As explained earlier, there must be 
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something deeper and more foundational tying the states together than just economic 
profitability. While it cannot be a traditional social identity, there must be something 
tying the structure together more profoundly that just profitability. Middelaar 
extrapolates from this point when he notes that beside the painful experience of the Euro 
crisis, few see the Union as a complete failure.153  The EU cannot be expected to save its 
members and citizens from every potential problem. He continues: “no project, no treaty 
can anticipate the creativity of history, let alone prepare an adequate response”154 
The Deception of National Identity as a Political Tool 
Groups and otherness within society have continued to change focus. Despite 
cultural differences, the divisions between segments of people are arguably smaller than 
they were a few centuries ago, thanks to communal areas, the Internet and popular 
culture. The cataclysmic differences are only seen as insurmountable because of short 
memory. Political differences have diminished within the EU, and it has therefore 
become natural to depend on and emphasize cultural and ethnical ones. Nationalism is 
now the driving force for cultural and political identifications within Europe. Yet, right-
leaning parties continue to depend on the strong nation supported by nationalism as a 
way of identification. Members of the immigrant-critical party in Sweden, the Swedish 
Democrats, argue that people cannot have two forms of identity at the same time. The 
process of assimilation to a new state is possible, but must diminish the sense of belonging 
to another state.  
Clearly, nationalism cannot support a union of ideologies; at the same time it is 
playing a central role in the EU itself. The solution seems to be a de-politicization of 
national identity. Undoing nationalism is an impossible task for the near future, but 
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distinguishing nationalism from the political system is possible. The EU could not replace 
this type of social belonging, for its unifying principle is formal and legal. Maintaining 
nationalism, along with other geographically distinctive elements such as cultural, 
personal ways of identifying would be a solution. These identification methods are not 
problematic in themselves; it is when they take over political structures and limit any 
broader scope of understanding an identifying. Political issues must be framed from more 
than that first level of consideration. 
Fluidity of the European Structure 
America connected its identity to the individual “pursuit of happiness,” its 
relationship between people and government is clarified through federalism. Where the 
EU is placing this social identity is up for grabs, as concepts are still ambiguous, especially 
since the European countries have nourished their nationalism for centuries. This could 
be seen a weak form of political or democratic identity, for while there is a notion of what 
is European it is not clear what actually goes in to that definition. However, this is the 
strength of the EU project, and the way it can distinguish itself from states and move 
beyond states’ ability to act democratically. By not being exclusionary, or have final 
borders, it is ambiguous enough to develop with social changes. At the same time, it is 
strong enough to encourage change and to promote further integration. As the EU 
continues to expand and develop, people are reforming and creating new understanding 
of themselves and the EU as an institution. With every step, notably the Enlargement of 
2004, skepticism turned in to comfort. Today, few would question Poland’s role in the 
EU. The mechanisms discussed earlier symbolize this ability of the EU to be a socially 
driving and identity-creating institution.  
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Democratic Inclusion and Limits Social Identity 
The correlation between democratic and social limits becomes a paradox of 
creating a united and inclusive identity outside the realms of nationalism and other 
exclusionary systems. There is a discrepancy between those who democratically, or 
structurally, belong within the EU and those who are assumed to have a natural 
connection the European Union. The foundation for a European political community 
ought to be purely normative supported through a political identity acceptant of 
regionality and other diverse identities. While a normative foundation, can also be 
exclusive and isolating, this limitation and regulation takes place in a more principled and 
reasonable way. While the EU’s weakness makes it inclusionary, there are still limits to or 
ability to identify with others politically. Questioning membership and belonging to the 
EU will always be an issue, this relates to Turkey’s pending membership as well.  
Every society needs to have an understanding of its own limits, in terms of agenda 
and idea. So what are the limits of the EU and how should the EU citizens identify 
themselves? National, regional or cultural distinctions do not fit the description of the 
European Union, and can therefore not bear the full weight of the European Union 
unity. It is especially difficult to create an identity around a continually shifting element. 
The consequence seems to be a legal and formal definition of EU citizenship, a definition 
that cannot encompass the whole of the European identity. This viewpoint requires us to 
explore why it is important to have a clear legal foundation, but also why this definition 
does not have to encompass the whole of European sentiment.155  
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What is the European Common Identity  
Even if democracy in the EU ought to be removed from the type of identity that 
nations are founded upon, can we create an inherent connection or reason for a 
European community? Are there are inherent links between the EU states and its 
citizens? The answer seems obvious. Yes, Europe is connected through history and 
culture. But, these are the kinds of foundations the EU cannot base its common identity 
on since that would only create a new super-state. At the same time, the identity and 
acceptance of association cannot be purely contractual and based on the benefits of being 
in said contract, assuming a country meets the normative foundation. As the EU is 
expanding its borders to include countries that do not share the same culture and history, 
as most of the original members did, a crystallization of this connection is becoming more 
and more essential for the success of the EU. Although this is not a very satisfactory 
answer to the issues of a common identity and its foundation, I argue that for the EU to 
make a claim towards a democratic society, their foundation must be normative and 
weak. Weak in that it does not depend on a traditional unity, but that it is fluid in its 
democracy. It cannot be an empirical cost-benefit analysis, but if we attempt to define the 
EU initiative through much more than a principle of democracy and cooperation, the EU 
project is in itself lost. 
The idea of the EU itself rests on stability and association for peace between the 
European countries, a relationship that runs much deeper than financial benefit. This 
position assumes some form of common identity, but not a cultural or social one. The 
problem with a normative foundation is the vagueness that comes with it. Little, in 
actuality, is tied to the current system of EU citizenship if this cultural unity is not 
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invoked.156 People’s connection between their history and identification with distinctive 
groups is multifaceted and an important aspect of their social lives, and should not have 
to be removed. It can, however, be separated from democracy and political institutions. 
While the identification with one’s political system is necessary, a divorce from democracy 
and socio-cultural identity, allows a more diversified discussion with people who are not 
required to be similar each other. The enlargements have made this further necessary by 
showing that the EU could not pretend to be inclusive while still resting on the underlying 
assumption of heterogeneity.  
 Philosopher Ernest Renan’s definition of a nation as “a spiritual principle” which 
possesses the “desire to live together”157 comes from the understanding of a rich legacy 
that through communal memory formation captures the sentiments when thinking of 
one’s nation. Does it however not provide a further legal connection for a nation state? In 
other words, does thinking that the state is the primary socio-cultural form of identity lead 
to a legal argument for national democracy? I say no. An isolated historical narrative is 
not enough to sustain an isolated politics. This is not to say, there is anything negative 
with these historic or social connections. They are just not enough for a full-blown legal 
foundation for a political community. Social and cultural difference can therefore not 
provide a reason to exclude any within this type of community.  
What I have found is an identity in flux. Not whimsical and volatile, but at its best, 
multifaceted. If individuals have the ability to identify with political and social changes 
through kaleidoscopic vision, meaning that association can develop later or sway 
depending on what they consider. While we might understand the EU and Europe to 
have a particular personality, it is not set in stone. There is a unified history among the 
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European countries, a violent and hostile one for the most part, and still anything besides 
cooperation would be unthinkable. This change has not come about only through an 
inherent connection between these states, but through hard work and an 
institutionalization of cooperation and interdependence. The weakness coming out of this 
means that it can continue to develop, but it also means that there is a possible common 
understanding of what is desired.   
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Conclusion 
 
The EU should be seen as a consequence of states’ inability to answer to the 
democratic needs of today and as the potential to expand our own senses of belonging. 
While we cannot speak of a final version of the EU, is it easy to see a trend of cooperation 
and an acknowledgment of codependence between countries and people. This paper has 
considered democracy and its ability to provide venues and pathways within a 
constitutional framework. The foundation for democracy is more generally accepted to be 
constitutional and is, for the EU, developed as a result of the need to identify an inclusive 
framework. While there might be a discrepancy between people’s common understanding 
and the actual functionality, a popular acceptance of the EU as a political mechanism is 
in itself important for democratic society. The definition of democracy, as a legal and 
constitutional acceptance of the rules, is not dependent on a united people’s voicing one 
coherent position. However, Europeans reshaping how they use and consider their role, 
with regards to the democratic society, could further enhance and support supranational 
democracy. The Union has not come about though natural belonging, but an attempt to 
stabilize through transnational institutions and then democratize and people and their 
relations.  
The EU has radically changed in both shape and view of its role. Through the 
Lisbon Treaty, the Union took the largest step towards integrating itself as a democratic 
tool. It follows in the footsteps of a more interconnected society and could therefore be 
seen as a forbearer of a new democratic system with greater sensitivity to the citizen as an 
individual. Mechanisms like the ECI and the Subsidiarity Principle are primary examples 
  85 
of these trends. Still, however positive and inclusive these changes may be, we must still 
look with caution at the complete dispersal of the institutional and democratic structures. 
Questions of effectiveness, in relations to these tools, need to be assessed further. The EU 
is still in the beginning stages of its own development. Still, it symbolizes the first step 
towards a democratic society that does not depend upon inherently exclusionary 
principles.  
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